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State Immunity and the Promise of Jus Cogens 
 
Sévrine Knuchel* 
I. INTRODUCTION  
¶1 On June 1, 2010, the Supreme Court of the United States held in Samantar v. 
Yousuf, that the U.S. statute governing the sovereign immunity of foreign states, the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), does not cover the immunity claims 
of individual foreign officials.1 In this case, five natives of Somalia were seeking 
damages from Mohamed Ali Samantar, who served as former Minister of Defense, First 
Vice President, and Prime Minister of the Democratic Republic of Somalia, and whom 
they claimed was responsible for the acts of torture, rape, arbitrary detention, and 
extrajudicial killing that were inflicted on them or their family members in Somalia 
during the 1980s.  
¶2 The Supreme Court’s decision comes as the jurisdictional immunity of states and 
their officials before the courts of foreign states in cases involving human rights 
violations has increasingly been called into question. Many human rights advocates and 
legal scholars view the granting of immunity to a state or its representatives from 
proceedings arising out of serious human rights violations as “artificial, unjust, and 
archaic,”2 and a number of recent decisions from domestic courts indicate that this 
practice might begin to change.3 One argument frequently raised to that effect postulates 
that the rules on sovereign immunity are defeated when the violations amount to the 
breach of a peremptory norm of international law, or “jus cogens.” This claim is featured 
prominently in several of the amicus curiae briefs submitted in Samantar, where the 
petitioner had allegedly violated a rule of peremptory character—namely the prohibition 
of torture.4 In its decision, the Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether 
                                                 
* Lic. Jur. Université de Lausanne (2005), LL.M. Boston College Law School (2009), Candidate for Ph.D. 
in International Law, Fribourg University, Switzerland; 2010-2011 Swiss National Science Foundation 
Fellow and Visiting Scholar at Boston College Law School, Newton, MA, USA 
(sevrine.knuchel@unifr.ch). I am grateful to Professor Samantha Besson for her helpful comments on the 
earlier versions of this article. 
1 Samantar v. Yousuf, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010). 
2 Adam C. Belsky et al., Implied Waiver Under The FSIA: A Proposed Exception To Immunity For 
Violations Of Peremptory Norms Of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REV. 365 (1989) (quoting Hersch 
Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign States, 28 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 220, 221 
(1951)). 
3 See, e.g., Pinochet (No. 3) R. v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet 
Ugarte (Amnesty International Intervening) (No. 3) [2000] AC 147; [1999] 2 WLR 827; [1999] 2 All ER 
97; 119 ILR 135 (U.K.) [hereinafter Pinochet]; Ferrini v. Federal Republic of Germany, Italian Court of 
Cassation, Decision No. 5044/2004, 11 March 2004, registered 11 March 2005, translated in 128 ILR 658 
(It.). 
4 Brief of Amici Curiae Dolly Filártiga, Sister Dianna Ortiz, and Other Torture Survivors and Their Family 
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granting immunity to the petitioner would be consistent with international law, let alone 
jus cogens. However, the issue is likely to resurface in later proceedings when the district 
court will have to determine on remand whether Samantar is entitled to immunity. 
¶3 This article seeks to analyze the impact of peremptory norms of international law 
on immunity assertions. Does the breach of a jus cogens norm, i.e., a norm “accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted” result in the loss of immunity of the state or its representative 
alleged to have violated the norm?5 This article will first outline the doctrine of foreign 
sovereign immunity and the notion of jus cogens. Next, it will consider whether, under 
international law, an exception to the immunity of foreign states or foreign officials has 
emerged in cases involving jus cogens violations, and examine the arguments commonly 
raised to that effect. Finally, it will undertake an analysis of relevant U.S. case law 
involving jus cogens and foreign sovereign immunity, in an effort to explore how 
domestic courts have dealt with the issue in the U.S. and which trends can be expected in 
light of Samantar.  
II. THE DOCTRINE OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 
¶4 When the courts of one state assume jurisdiction over another state or its 
representatives, the authority of the forum state to adjudicate the dispute conflicts with 
the principle of state equality, often expressed by the maxim “par in parem non habet 
imperium.”6 Over time, a number of customary rules barring domestic courts from 
adjudicating disputes involving another state have emerged under international law. 
These rules are commonly justified by the need to avoid interference with the exercise of 
its sovereign prerogatives by the foreign state and to allow its representatives to perform 
their official duties without undue impairment. The International Law Commission (ILC) 
explained that customary international law on state immunity has grown “principally and 
essentially out of the judicial practice of States on the matter, although in actual practice 
other branches of the government, namely, the executive and the legislature, have had 
their share in the progressive evolution of rules of international law.”7  
¶5 Identifying the international rules governing state immunity proves to be a difficult 
task for several reasons. First, as noted by the ILC, “[t]he sources of international law on 
                                                                                                                                                 
Members, Human Rights Organizations, Religious Organizations, and Torture Survivors Support 
Organizations in Support of the Respondents at 24, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555); Brief 
for Amicus Curiae The Anti-Defamation League, Supporting Neither Side at 5-6, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 
2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555); Amicus Curiae Brief of the American Jewish Congress in Support of Petitioner 
at 30-33, Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555) (concluding that the argument should be 
rejected); Brief of Amici Curiae Martin Weiss, Gerald Rosenstein, Progressive Jewish Alliance, 
Association Of Humanistic Rabbis, Jews Against Genocide, Stop Genocide Now, Save Darfur Coalition, 
Darfur and Beyond, Defend Darfur Dallas, Texans Against Genocide, San Francisco Bay Area Darfur 
Coalition, and Massachusetts Coalition To Save Darfur in Support of Respondents at 8-16, Samantar, 130 
S. Ct. 2278 (2010) (No. 08-1555). 
5 See the definition of peremptory norms of international law provided under Article 53 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, U.N.T.S. Regis. No. 18, 232, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.39/27 (1969). 
6 “An equal has no power over an equal.” Doctrinal contributions on foreign sovereign immunity are 
abundant. For a recent analysis, see HAZEL FOX, THE LAW OF STATE IMMUNITY (2d ed. 2008). 
7 Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, ¶ 23, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/323, reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 231 (1979).  
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the subject of State immunities appear to be more widely scattered than normally 
expected in the search for rules of international law on any other topic.”8 Moreover, the 
practice of states on the matter is not uniform. As of today, it seems generally accepted 
that the immunity of states is no longer absolute: a foreign state will be accorded 
immunity only for claims arising out of sovereign acts (acta jure imperii), as opposed to 
the claims arising out of its commercial transactions or “private law” activities (acta jure 
gestionis). However, the exact scope of this so-called “restrictive” doctrine of state 
immunity remains unclear. If, over time, most countries have similarly extended their 
courts’ reach over foreign states’ activities, international consensus on the matter “exists 
only at a rather high level of abstraction,” and the details of the international law of state 
immunity are not always certain.9 The opacity of state practice is also due to the 
sensitivity of the questions at stake: often, legal decisions regarding state immunity yield 
to considerations of foreign relations and policy, so as to maintain friendly relations with 
the foreign sovereign. 
¶6 Against this backdrop, the adoption, in 2004, of the United Nations Convention on 
Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property (JISP Convention) appeared as a 
major step towards enhanced legal certainty in this area of law. Designed to achieve “the 
codification and development of international law and the harmonization of practice in 
this area,” the JISP Convention embraces the restrictive approach to state immunity. 
While it has not yet entered into force, it seems likely that the 30 ratifications necessary 
to bring it into effect will soon be achieved.10 The support already demonstrated for this 
instrument by states which traditionally favored absolute immunity in the past, such as 
Russia and China, indicates how custom has evolved in this area and demonstrates that 
the JISP Convention can be expected to establish a universal standard for the treatment of 
state immunity by individual national legal systems.  
¶7 With respect to individual officials, under international law “[a] distinction is 
usually drawn between two types of immunity …: immunity ratione personae and 
immunity ratione materiae.”11 The former, also known as personal immunity, is enjoyed 
solely by foreign officials occupying senior or high-level government posts, such as 
heads of state.12 This type of immunity attaches to the status of the individual official, 
thus covering both official and private conduct, irrespective of whether the action was 
carried out before or during time of agency. Personal immunity, whose purpose is to 
ensure that high ranking officials may “act freely on the inter-State level without 
unwarranted interference” ends when they complete their service.13 Subsequently, they 
are entitled to immunity ratione materiae, also called “functional immunity,” which is the 
same type of immunity as the one enjoyed by all foreign officials regardless of rank. This 
                                                 
8 Id. ¶ 22. 
9 Joseph W. Dellapenna, Foreign State Immunity in Europe, 5 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 51, 61 (1992).  
10 See the Preamble of the United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their 
Property, opened for signature Jan. 17, 2005, reprinted in 44 ILM 803 (2005) [hereinafter JISP 
Convention]. As of June 2011, 28 states have signed it and 11 have ratified it.    
11 Special Rapporteur, Preliminary Report on Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal 
Jurisdiction, ¶ 78, UN Doc. A/CN.4/601, reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 37 (2008).  
12 International law further confers extensive immunities to members of diplomatic missions and consular 
posts. Regulated by a distinct legal regime, the so-called diplomatic and consular immunities are outside of 
the scope of this article. 
13 Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), 2002 I.C.J. 3, ¶¶74-75 
(Feb. 14) (Joint Sep. Op. of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Burgenthal) [hereinafter Arrest Warrant Case] 
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type of immunity does not extend to the acts performed in a private capacity, but covers 
solely the acts performed in an official capacity. However, functional immunity does not 
cease when the official leaves government service. Former state officials continue to 
enjoy immunity ratione materiae for the acts performed while serving in an official 
capacity. 
¶8 The distinction between immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae 
is expressly mentioned in the JISP Convention: under Article 3.2, it is specified that the 
personal immunity enjoyed by heads of state is excluded from the scope of that 
instrument.14 However, the provisions of the JISP Convention are relevant in determining 
the scope of the functional immunity of all state officials, since these are assimilated to 
the state when “acting in that capacity” (that is, when they act in their official capacity).15  
III. JUS COGENS VERSUS FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
¶9 This Section examines whether, under international law, sovereign immunity 
remains a valid defense against allegations of jus cogens violations. It first introduces the 
conflict arising between sovereign immunity and the protection of human rights, and then 
reviews whether an exception has emerged under customary international law. Finally, it 
analyses the arguments brought forward to that effect. 
A. The Protection of Human Rights as a New Challenge to the Immunity of States and 
their Officials 
¶10 The individual’s position under international law has evolved considerably in the 
past several decades. The law has recognized individuals as persons entitled to a number 
of fundamental rights and remedies for violations of those rights. At the same time, the 
prospect of international enforcement of these rights remains uncertain, as the 
development of adjudication mechanisms is still at an embryonic stage. As a result, 
victims of international human rights violations have begun to explore other avenues for 
obtaining reparation, notably by turning to civil actions in national courts. However, it is 
specifically at the national level that their efforts to obtain redress for the violation of 
international law are likely to encounter the obstacle of the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.  
¶11 Building on the recognition of the enhanced status of the individual, increasing 
pressure has been placed on states to lift the hurdles preventing victims from obtaining 
reparation. Non-binding instruments which stress the duty of states to afford remedies for 
victims of violations of international law have multiplied, outlining a new “victim-
oriented perspective” to be adopted by the international community.16 In 2002, the entry 
                                                 
14 Although the usefulness of the analytical distinction between functional and personal immunity is widely 
recognized, it must be noted that the ICJ did not refer to the categorization of immunity “ratione personae” 
and “ratione materiae” in ruling on the scope of immunity accruing to state officials. The ICJ considered 
whether the acts of state representatives had been performed in an official capacity or in a private capacity, 
while in service or out of office, without using this specific denomination. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant Case, 
supra note 13. 
15 See JISP Convention, supra note 10, art. 2.1 (b) (iv). 
16 See the Preamble of G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147 (Dec. 16, 2005) (adopting “Basic 
Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of 
International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law”).  
Vol. 9:2] SÉVRINE KNUCHEL 153 
 
into force of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court reaffirmed that 
individuals can be held criminally responsible for international crimes. To “put an end to 
impunity,” the Rome Statute stresses that the official status as state representative will in 
no case “exempt [the perpetrators of these crimes] from criminal responsibility,” nor “bar 
the Court from exercising its jurisdiction.”17 Moreover, the Rome Statute includes the 
notable innovation of allowing victims to participate in the proceedings and obtain some 
form of reparation for their suffering. 
¶12 Along with these developments, the perception has grown that immunity is an 
unjust bar to remedies for violations of international law, eclipsing its significance as 
necessary attribute of the equality of states. This perception was further nourished by the 
progressive recognition of the superior status of a number of international norms deemed 
to possess a greater normative weight. These norms, known as peremptory norms of 
international law or jus cogens, serve as a check on the actions of states, which must 
adhere to them in all circumstances. As discussed below, their higher rank in the 
emerging hierarchy of international rules was put forward as another reason for lifting 
sovereign immunity in claims arising from their alleged violation. 
B. Jus Cogens Violations: A New Exception to the Sovereign Immunity of Foreign States 
and their Officials under Customary International Law? 
1. Background: the Notion of Jus Cogens 
¶13 Under international law, a norm having the character of jus cogens is a norm from 
which states are not allowed to depart under any circumstances. Unlike other 
international legal norms, states cannot choose to reverse these norms by either treaty or 
practice. This notion was codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
which defines a peremptory norm of international law as “a norm accepted and 
recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from which no 
derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general 
international law having the same character.”18 The practice of states and international 
jurisdictions has identified many rules of international law as having a peremptory 
character, such as the prohibition of the use of force enunciated in the U.N. Charter, the 
prohibition of torture, piracy, and the prohibition of genocide.19 Peremptory norms 
impose material constraints on states for the protection of values deemed important to the 
international community. As stated by the ILC, “[a] feature common to [jus cogens 
norms], or to a great many of them, evidently is that they involve not only legal rules but 
considerations of morals and of international good order.”20 
                                                 
17Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, adopted July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90, reprinted in 
37 ILM 1002 (1998), pmbl. and art. 27.  
18 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, art. 53. 
19 In its commentaries to the 2001 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts, the ILC gave as examples of jus cogens norms the prohibition of aggression, slavery and slave trade, 
genocide, racial discrimination and apartheid, torture, the basic rules of international humanitarian law 
applicable in armed conflict and the principle of self-determination. Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Commentaries, Art. 40, ¶¶ 4-6, in Report of the International Law 
Commission on the Work of Its Fifty-third Session, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. 
A/56/10 (2001).  
20 Special Rapporteur Third Report on Law of Treaties, Commentary on art. 17, ¶76, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1958/Add.l., reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 41 (1958). 
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¶14 The operation of peremptory norms is not restricted to the law of treaties. As an 
internationally wrongful act, the violation of a jus cogens rule involves the responsibility 
of the state itself (this point was made clear in the ILC’s Draft Articles on Responsibility 
of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by a resolution of the U.N. General 
Assembly in 2001), as well as the individual responsibility of the perpetrator.21 Moreover, 
because the violation of peremptory norms offends the interests of the community as a 
whole, the principle that states can extend their jurisdiction over such violations even 
when they have been committed extraterritorially has come to be affirmed by both 
international instruments and national legislatures.22   
2. Immunity of the Foreign State 
¶15 Under international law, foreign state immunity with respect to acts committed in 
the exercise of sovereign authority (acta jure imperii) seems to remain the rule, even 
when these acts are committed in violation of a norm which has the character of jus 
cogens. 
¶16 Although the question of “the existence or non-existence of immunity in the case of 
violation by a State of jus cogens norms of international law” was considered during the 
elaboration of the JISP Convention, the issue did “not seem to be ripe enough for the 
Working Group to engage in a codification exercise over it.”23 Noting that “[s]ome 
criticism has been leveled at the Convention on the ground that it does not remove 
immunity in cases involving claims for civil damages against States for serious violations 
of human rights,” the Chairman of the Working Group of the ILC explained that because 
“there was no clearly established pattern by States in this regard…any attempt to include 
such a provision would, almost certainly jeopardize the conclusion of the Convention.”24  
¶17 However, one cannot infer from the JISP Convention’s silence that the issue is a 
settled one. On the contrary, the Working Group cautioned that recent developments in 
this regard “should not be ignored.”25 Even if “in most cases, the plea of sovereign 
immunity has succeeded,” the Working Group also observed that national courts had 
shown “some sympathy” for “the argument increasingly put forward that immunity 
should be denied in the case of death or personal injury resulting from acts of a State in 
violation of human rights norms having the character of jus cogens, particularly the 
prohibition on torture.”26 This nascent trend toward a new exception to state immunity 
                                                 
21 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 19, art. 26 and 
pt. 2, ch. III (on “Serious breaches of obligations under peremptory norms of general international law.”). 
22 See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT) arts. 5, 7, Dec. 10, 1984, 1456 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War, arts. 49, 50, 129, 146, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; in the U.S., the 
Torture Victim Protection Act is an example of national legislation providing such form of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction (see infra, Section IV.B).  
23 Chairman of the Working Group, Report: Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and their 
Property, ¶¶ 46-47, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/54/L.12 (Nov. 12, 1999). 
24 Gerhard Hafner, former Chairman of the U.N. Committees on negotiation of the new Convention, 
Remarks at the Chatham House “State Immunity and the New U.N. Convention” Conference (Oct. 5, 2005) 
(transcript available in Chatham House, State Immunity and the New UN Convention: Transcripts and 
Summaries of Presentations and Discussions). 
25 Report of the Working Group on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1999/Add.1 (Part 2), reprinted in 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, 149,172 (1999). 
26 Id. 
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might expand so as to become, in the long run, a general practice supported by opinio 
juris and crystallize in a new rule of customary international law. This possibility is 
acknowledged in the declarations made by three states when they ratified the JISP 
Convention, stressing that this instrument was “without prejudice to any future 
international development in the protection of human rights.”27 
¶18 As for now, the practice of withdrawing state immunity in cases of a breach of 
peremptory norms or other human rights violations remains sparse. In 1996, the U.S. 
passed an amendment to the FSIA in order to deny ‘state sponsors of terrorism’ immunity 
in civil proceedings for terrorism related offenses.28 However, outside of the scope of this 
exception, U.S. courts have largely rejected claims that a foreign state should be denied 
immunity because of its alleged violation of a human rights norm (including those of a 
jus cogens character).29 As for other jurisdictions, two decisions handed down by national 
supreme courts that dealt with violations of the humanitarian laws of war during World 
War II are often cited in support of a new “human rights” exception to state immunity. In 
2000, the Greek Supreme Court, faced with a civil claim for damages arising from crimes 
committed against the civilian population of a Greek village by a German SS unit 
rejected Germany’s plea of immunity.30 Four years later, in the Ferrini case, the Italian 
Court of Cassation denied Germany immunity in a civil claim for damages filed by an 
Italian civilian who had unsuccessfully tried to obtain compensation in German courts for 
his deportation to a forced labor camp in Germany.31 However, courts in Canada, 
England and France have upheld immunity in respect of civil claims for damages brought 
against foreign states for serious human rights violations, even when the infringed norms 
were part of the jus cogens catalogue.32 
                                                 
27 Declaration made by Norway. Sweden and Switzerland made similar declarations. These declarations are 
available at http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=III-13&chapter=3& 
lang=en#EndDec. 
28 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1605A(5). 
29 U.S. case law is addressed in details under Section IV.B infra. 
30 For the Court, the acts committed by the SS unit violated preemptory rules of international law; see 
Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, Case No. 11/2000, Areios Pagos (Hellenic Supreme 
Court) May 4, 2000, 129 ILR 513, 514. For a commentary, see, e.g, Maria Gavouneli & Ilias Bantekas, 
Case Report: Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 198 (2001); Elena 
Vournas, Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany: Sovereign Immunity and the Exception for 
Jus Cogens Violations, 21 N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 629, 648 (2002). This decision was eventually 
reversed on Sept. 17, 2002 by a Special Supreme Court adjudicating disputes relating to international law. 
An English translation of the Special Supreme Court’s decision is available at 56 RHDI 199 (2003). The 
Special Supreme Court concluded that “the foreign state is still enjoying the privilege of immunity, when 
sued for actions that took place in the territory of the forum and in which its armed forces were in anyway 
implicated, without a further distinction as to whether these acts violate jus cogens […].” See 56 RHDI 
199, 204 (2003). 
31The Court accepted the defendant’s contention that deportation and forced labor are international crimes 
belonging to jus cogens; see Ferrini, Decision No. 5044/2004, at 660. The Italian Supreme Court 
reaffirmed its decision in a series of decisions delivered on 29 May 2008 and in a further judgment of 21 
October 2008. For a commentary, see, e.g. Carlo Focarelli, Federal Republic of Germany v. Giovanni 
Mantelli and Others, Order No. 14201, 103 AM. J. INT’L L. 122 (2009). 
32 See Bouzari v. Iran, 114 A.C.W.S. 3d 57 (Ont. Super. Ct. Justice 2002), aff'd 71 O.R.3d 675 (Ont. Ct. 
App. 2004), 128 ILR 586, 587-590; Al-Adsani v. Government of Kuwait and Others, CA,,12 March 1996, 
107 ILR 536, 537; Jones v. Ministry of Interior of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, [2006] UKHL 26 (June 
14, 2006) [hereinafter Jones]; Bucheron v. Federal Republic of Germany, Cass. 1e civ., Dec. 16, 2003, 
Bull. civ. 02-45961. 
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¶19 In 2008, Germany instituted proceedings before the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) to determine whether, by denying its immunity in civil claims based on violations 
of international humanitarian law during World War II in the Ferrini line of cases, Italy 
infringed its obligations under international law.33 In light of the paucity of judicial 
support existing to date for an exception to state immunity for gross human rights 
violations, an ICJ ruling to that effect seems rather unlikely. So far, the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR), the only international court to have dealt with the issue, has 
rejected the view that a grant of immunity to the respondent state in a damage claim for 
acts of torture violated the individual’s right of access to a court guaranteed by the 
European Convention on Human Rights.34 In a later case, the ECHR confirmed this 
holding with respect to the immunity of the foreign state from measures of execution.35  
3. Immunity of the Foreign Official 
¶20 The scope of immunity enjoyed by state officials has been dramatically reduced 
with the development of international criminal jurisdiction: the rule that the official status 
of the perpetrator does not constitute a defense to the commission of international crimes 
is now generally applicable before international criminal courts.36 However, with respect 
to proceedings before domestic courts, the picture appears more nuanced and the answer 
varies depending on the type of immunity enjoyed by the state official. 
i) Personal immunity (immunity ratione personae) 
¶21 As to the personal immunity enjoyed by certain high ranking officials during their 
time in office, absolute immunity from civil and criminal proceedings in national courts 
continues to be the rule in practice.37 As highlighted by the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant 
case, “in international law it is firmly established that…certain holders of high-ranking 
office in a State, such as the Head of State, the Head of Government and Minister for 
Foreign Affairs, enjoy immunities from jurisdiction in other States, both civil and 
criminal.”38 In that case, the ICJ found itself unable to deduce from state practice “that 
there exists under customary international law any form of exception to the rule 
according immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability to incumbent Ministers 
for Foreign Affairs, where they are suspected of having committed war crimes or crimes 
against humanity.”39 The “full immunity from criminal jurisdiction and inviolability” of 
an incumbent head of state before the courts of another state was later reaffirmed by the 
ICJ in Djibouti v. France.40  
                                                 
33 See Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, Germany Institutes Proceedings Against Italy for Failing to 
Respect its Jurisdictional Immunity as a Sovereign State, I.C.J. Press Release No. 2008/44 (December 23, 
2008). 
34 Al-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79. 
35 Kalogeropoulou v. Greece, App. No. 59021/00 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Dec. 12, 2002) (admissibility). 
36 See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, supra note 17, art. 27; Updated Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, adopted by S.C. Res. 827, S/RES/827 (May 25, 
1993), art. 7 (2). 
37 See, e.g., International Law Commission, Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal 
Jurisdiction: Memorandum by the Secretariat, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/596 (March 31, 2008), ¶ 99; Fox, supra 
note 6, at 686. 
38 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 13, ¶ 51.  
39 Id. ¶ 58. 
40 Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 2008 I.C.J. 177, 236, 237 
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ii) Functional immunity (immunity ratione materiae) 
¶22 For the ICJ, there are only four circumstances in which the personal immunity of a 
high ranking official would not represent a bar to criminal prosecution: (1) when the 
individual is prosecuted in his or her own country; (2) when the state which the 
individual represented decides to waive immunity; (3) when the individual is no longer in 
office and the foreign court’s prosecution pertains to acts committed prior or subsequent 
to his or her period in service, or to acts committed while in service, but in a private 
capacity; and (4) when the individual is subject to criminal proceedings before certain 
international criminal courts, where they have jurisdiction.41 
¶23 This obiter dictum from the Arrest Warrant case has been widely criticized in the 
literature, as well as in some of the separate opinions filed by other judges in the case.42 
Most of the criticisms are directed at part (3) of the obiter dictum, which addresses the 
scope of immunity of a senior state official who is no longer in office. As explained 
under Section II, when a high-ranking official leaves his or her post, his or her personal 
immunity ceases. From this point, he or she is entitled, like any other state official, to 
functional immunity, which covers the acts committed in an official capacity even after 
the official has left service. With this kind of immunity, the practice of national courts 
seems to have evolved: domestic authorities have increasingly considered that functional 
immunity was not applicable to crimes under international law rising to the level of jus 
cogens, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and torture. For example, 
in the Pinochet (No. 3) case, the British House of Lords rejected former Chilean 
President Augusto Pinochet’s claim that he was entitled to immunity from arrest with 
respect to the acts of torture he allegedly committed during his presidency.43 Courts in the 
U.S., Italy, Spain, and recently, the Committee of African Jurists established by the 
African Union to examine the question of the prosecution of Hissène Habré, among 
others, have also considered that state officials do not enjoy immunity from proceedings 
arising from these crimes.44 Such an exception has further been endorsed by the Appeals 
Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 
which held that “those responsible for such crimes cannot invoke immunity from national 
or international jurisdiction even if they perpetrated such crimes while acting in their 
official capacity.”45  
                                                                                                                                                 
(June 4). 
41 See Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 13, ¶ 61 (obiter dictum). 
42 See, e.g., Antonio Cassese, When May Senior State Officials Be Tried for International Crimes? Some 
Comments on the Congo v. Belgium Case, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 853 (2002); see also, e.g., Arrest Warrant 
case, supra note 13, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Van den Wyngaert, at 153, ¶ 27 (finding a “fundamental 
problem” in the Court’s approach “that disregards the whole recent movement in modern international 
criminal law towards recognition of the principle of individual accountability for international core 
crimes”). 
43 Pinochet (No. 3) R., ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International Intervening) (No. 3) [2000] AC 
147.  
44See, e.g., (U.S.) Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 176 (D. Mass. 1995); (Italy) Court of Cassation, 
Ferrini, Decision No. 5044/2004, at 674, ¶ 11; (Spain) Request for extradition delivered on 3 November 
1998, Auto de solicitud de extradición de Pinochet, [Request for the Extradition of Pinochet], Madrid, ¶ 4, 
(Nov. 3, 1998), 3 November 1998 (reproduced at in http://www.ua.es/up/pinochet/documentos/auto-03-11-
98/auto24.htm), ¶ 4, 5 (d); (African Union) Report of the Committee of Eminent African Jurists on the case 
of Hissène Habré, submitted to the Summit of the African Union in July 2006, ¶ 13, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/CEJA_Repor0506.pdfhttp://www.hrw.org/en/habre-case.  
45 Prosecutor v. Blaškić (Case No. IT-95-14), Appeals Chamber, Judgment on the Request of the Republic 
of Croatia for the Review of the Decision of Trial Chamber II of 18 July 1997, ¶ 41 (Oct. 29, 1997). 
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¶24 However, national authorities are not uniform in the practice of denying functional 
immunity to foreign officials accused of crimes under international law. For example, the 
immunity of the former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld in a criminal 
procedure involving allegations of acts amounting to crimes under international law was 
recognized by the District Prosecutor of Paris.46 Moreover, so far, apart from some 
decisions rendered by U.S. courts in the context of human rights litigation (see Section 
IV.B infra), the removal of immunity of state officials tends to be exercised only in 
criminal, as opposed to civil proceedings.47 For example, in the Jones case, the House of 
Lords, unlike its decision in the criminal proceedings against Augusto Pinochet, granted 
immunity from civil jurisdiction to Saudi Arabian officials for alleged acts of torture.48 
The need for such distinction is often justified by the position of the foreign state in each 
proceeding: as under international law, a state cannot be held criminally responsible, it 
cannot be directly impleaded by criminal proceedings against its officials, whereas a civil 
claim for damages against a state official could potentially give rise to a similar claim 
against the state itself.49 The latter situation would therefore constitute a more direct 
exercise of jurisdiction over the other state. 
¶25 The obiter dictum of the ICJ in the Arrest Warrant case seems to indicate that the 
Court is of the view that an exception to functional immunity for international crimes has 
not even matured in the context of criminal proceedings. As a former minister for foreign 
affairs may be prosecuted only for the acts committed during office “in a private 
capacity,” the ICJ’s obiter dictum can be interpreted as denying the right of a foreign 
state to prosecute him or her for crimes under international law allegedly committed 
while in service.50 This position seems to run counter to the recent developments 
mentioned earlier. After reviewing the practice of national courts, the Institute of 
International Law concluded, in its 2009 Resolution “on the Immunity from Jurisdiction 
of the State and of Persons Who Act on Behalf of the State in case of International 
Crimes,” that such crimes were excluded from the scope of functional immunity enjoyed 
by individuals acting on behalf of a state.51 The International Law Association asserted 
the same conclusion.52 The ICJ has yet to address this issue in ratio decidendi. 
                                                 
46 Letter from Paris Prosecutor Jean-Claude Marin to filing attorney Patrick Baudouin (Nov. 16, 1997) 
dated 16 November 2007, available at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/reponseproc23nov07.pdf. 
47 See FOX, supra note 6, at 699.  
48 Jones, supra note 32.  
49 See, e.g., id. at 31 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill).  
50 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 13, ¶ 61 (obiter dictum). 
51 Institute of International law, Résolution sur l’immunité de juridiction de l’Etat et de ses agents en cas de 
crimes internationaux [Resolution on the Immunity from Jurisdiction of the State and of Persons Who Act 
on Behalf of the State in Ccase of International Crimes], (Naples, 2009), Art. III, available at 
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/2009_naples_01_en.pdf. The Institute had already stated in a 
Resolution adopted in 2001 that former heads of state were not immune for international crimes committed 
during their time in office; see Les immunités de juridiction et d’exécution du chef d’Etat 
et de gouvernement en droit international [Resolution on Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution of 
Heads of State and Heads of Government in International Law], (Vancouver, 2001), Art. 13, available at 
http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE// 
2001_van_02_en.PDF. 
52 International Law Association, “Final Report on the Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction in Respect of 
Gross Human Rights Offences,” 69 INT’L L. ASSOC. REP. CONF. 403, 423 (London, July 25-29, 2000) 
(Conclusions and recommendations, No. 4: “No immunities in respect of gross human rights offences 
subject to universal jurisdiction shall apply on the grounds that crimes were perpetrated in an official 
capacity”). 
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C. Arguments in Favor of a Jus Cogens Exception to the Doctrine of Foreign Sovereign 
Immunity 
¶26 Because of the special status of jus cogens, many human rights advocates and legal 
scholars argue that breaches of peremptory norms imply that foreign states or foreign 
officials must be denied immunity in proceedings arising out of such violations. Various 
lines of reasoning have been followed in support of that claim, each of which will now be 
addressed in turn. 
1. The Normative Hierarchy Argument   
“[A] jus cogens rule…overrides any other rule which does not have the 
same status.”53 
¶27 One argument, derived from the concept of a normative hierarchy within 
international law, postulates that because the rules governing the immunity of states and 
their officials are not part of the jus cogens catalogue, they rank lower in the hierarchy of 
international rules. Consequently, jus cogens should trump the rules on foreign sovereign 
immunity. This contention figures prominently in the case of Al-Adsani v. United 
Kingdom decided by the ECHR in 2001.54 In this case, the Court, by a bare 9-to-8 
majority of the Judges, rejected the view that the violation of the peremptory norm of 
international law on the prohibition of torture compelled denial of state immunity in civil 
suits. However, in a joint dissenting opinion, six Judges agreed that jus cogens norms 
superseded ordinary international rules, including the rules on state immunity: 
“For the basic characteristic of a jus cogens rule is that, as a source of law 
in the now vertical international legal system, it overrides any other rule 
which does not have the same status. In the event of a conflict between a 
jus cogens rule and any other rule of international law, the former prevails. 
The consequence of such prevalence is that the conflicting rule is null and 
void, or, in any event, does not produce legal effects which are in 
contradiction with the content of the peremptory rule.”55 
This reasoning has far-reaching implications. Judge Pellonpää noted in particular that if 
the jus cogens nature of the prohibition of torture prevailed over all other obligations of a 
lower hierarchical status, it would also have to prevail over the rules concerning 
immunity from execution.56 In that scenario, states would have to allow attachment and 
execution against public property of respondent states (including embassy buildings), at 
                                                 
53 Al-Adsani v. U.K., 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 111-112 (Rozakis & Caflisch, J.J., dissenting, joined by 
Judges Wildhaber, Costa, Cabral Barreto and Vajić) [hereinafter Diss. Op. of Judge Rozakis et al.].  
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 111, 112 (Diss. Op. of Judge Rozakis et al.). 
56 Id. at 108 (Concurring Op. of Judge Pellonpää, J., joined by Judge Sir Nicola Bratza, J., concurring) 
Under international law, a foreign state’s immunity from execution against its property in use for 
government purposes remains the rule; see, e.g., FOX, supra note 6, at 599-662. 
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the risk of jeopardizing the “basic framework” sustaining the conduct of international 
relations.57 
¶28 This observation about the rules on immunity from execution is illustrative of the 
major concern arising with the argument sustained by the minority in Al-Adsani. As 
highlighted by one commentator, “[t]alk of any sort of ordering amongst legal rules 
makes sense only if those rules are in conflict at the level of substance.”58 But there is no 
actual conflict between the jus cogens prohibition of torture and the rules on state 
immunity from jurisdiction (or, as in the concurring opinion of Judge Pellonpää, the rules 
on state immunity from execution). A conflict would occur between state immunity and a 
secondary rule according to which states were required to assume civil jurisdiction over 
other states with respect to allegations of torture. However, the prohibition of torture is a 
primary norm, which solely aims at outlawing the practice of torture; as such, it does not 
stipulate anything about the ways in which the rule must be enforced.59 For the normative 
hierarchy argument to prevail, it would be necessary to show that another jus cogens 
norm has emerged under international law that obliges the forum state to provide victims 
with civil remedies for acts committed abroad by the foreign state. However, the 
existence, under customary international law or treaty, let alone the peremptory status of 
such a norm, is dubious.60 
 
¶29 In order to circumvent this difficulty, some supporters of the normative hierarchy 
argument contend that a procedural jus cogens rule can be derived from the peremptory 
character of the substantive rule.61 As peremptory norms prohibit certain conduct for the 
sake of the entire international community, their superior status would imply superior 
means of enforcement. Accordingly, they conclude that “[t]he material jus cogens rule 
also contains a procedural jus cogens rule prohibiting certain limits to its enforcement.”62 
                                                 
57 Al-Adsani v. U.K., 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 108.  
58 Emmanuel Voyiakis, Access to Court v. State Immunity, 52 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 297, 320 (2003). 
59 Id. at 321; see also, Lee M. Caplan, State Immunity, Human Rights and Jus Cogens: A Critique of the 
Normative Hierarchy Theory, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 741, 772 (2003); FOX, supra note 6, at 151; Thomas 
Giegerich, Do Damages Claims Arising from Jus Cogens Violations Override State Immunity from the 
Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts?, in Tomuschat and Thouvenin (eds.), THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: JUS COGENS AND OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES 227 (Christian Tomuschat & 
Jean-Marc Thouvenin eds., 2006); Christian Tomuschat, L'immunité des États en cas de violation grave des 
droits de l'homme, 2005 RGDIP 51, 57, 58 (2005); Xiaodong Yang, Jus Cogens and State Immunity, 3 N.Z. 
Y.B. INT’L L. 131, 148-49 (2006). 
60 While the language of Art. 14 of the Convention against Torture provides some support for that 
interpretation, whether or not the CAT requires state parties to provide civil remedies for acts of torture 
committed beyond the forum state’s territory is disputed. See, e.g., Andrew Byrnes, Civil Remedies for 
Torture Committed abroad: An Obligation under the Convention Against Torture?, in TORTURE AS TORT: 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION 
(Craig M. Scott ed., 2001) 539, 540; Donald F. Donovan & Anthea Roberts, ‘The Emerging Recognition of 
Universal Jurisdiction’, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 148 (2006); Alexander Orakhelashvili, State Immunity and 
Hierarchy of Norms: Why the House of Lords Got It Wrong, 18 EUR. J. INT’L L. 955, 960-963 (2007). 
61 See, e.g. Alexander Orakhelashvili, State Immunity and International Public Order, 45 GERMAN Y.B. 
INT’L L. 227, 258 (2002); Kerstin Bartsch & Björn Elberling, Jus Cogens vs. State Immunity, Round Two: 
The Decision of the European Court of Human Rights in the Kalogeropoulou et al. v. Greece and Germany 
Decision, 4 GERMAN L. J. 477, 486-488 (2003). 
62 Bartsch & Elberling, supra note 61, at 487. The argument was rejected by the House of Lord in the Jones 
case; see Jones, supra note 32, ¶ 45 (Lord Hoffmann); Bucheron v. Federal Republic of Germany, Cass. 1e 
civ., Dec. 16, 2003, Bull. civ. 02-45961.] 
Vol. 9:2] SÉVRINE KNUCHEL 161 
 
¶30 But which limits does it prohibit? In other words, what is the scope of this 
procedural peremptory rule that the substantive rule carries with it? In the absence of a 
centralized mechanism for the enforcement of international norms, there remains little 
guidance to answer this question. Are states obliged to secure the enforcement of the 
norm at the international level, or is it suitable for them to enforce the norm before their 
domestic authorities? And how far would the overriding effect of such a procedural norm 
go? It is suggested in the literature that “not every limit to the judicial enforcement of a 
jus cogens norm can be prohibited under this concept,” and that “[l]imits resulting from 
the very nature of a court trial…would of course still be valid.”63 Nevertheless, the 
precise implications of this ancillary peremptory procedural obligation remain obscure. In 
Bouzari v. Iran, the Court of Appeal for Ontario denied its existence in categorical terms: 
“The peremptory norm of prohibition against torture does not encompass the civil remedy 
contended for by the appellant.”64 
¶31 If, in practice, the operation of jus cogens had admittedly extended beyond the law 
of treaties to areas such as state responsibility, the contention that “‘[t]he whole cluster of 
legal standards’ emanating from a peremptory norm and supporting its enforcement 
should be considered peremptory as well,” seems to gather little support.65 In A. v. 
Secretary of State, the British House of Lords stated that the peremptory status of the 
prohibition of torture “requires member states to do more than eschew the practice of 
torture.”66 As a result, the House of Lords refused to admit evidence obtained abroad 
through torture as valid evidence before English courts. However, the “duty of states” to 
“reject the fruits of torture inflicted in breach of international law” was not deemed 
peremptory: such duty was considered to exist “save perhaps in limited and exceptional 
circumstances, as where immediately necessary to protect a person from unlawful 
violence or property from destruction.”67 
¶32 Some international tribunals have considered that the consequences of the violation 
of jus cogens were extensive, by holding notably that amnesties granted for the violation 
of a peremptory norm had no legal effect.68 For example, in the Furundžija case, the Trial 
Chamber of the ICTY stated that:  
“The fact that torture is prohibited by a peremptory norm of international 
law has other effects at the inter-state and individual levels. At the inter-
state level, it serves to internationally de-legitimize any legislative, 
administrative or judicial act authorizing torture. It would be senseless to 
argue, on the one hand, that on account of the jus cogens value of the 
prohibition against torture, treaties or customary rules would be null and 
void ab initio and then be unmindful of a State say, taking national 
measures authorizing or condoning torture or absolving its perpetrators 
through an amnesty law. If such a situation were to arise, the national 
                                                 
63 Bartsch & Elberling, supra note 61, at 487, n. 69.  
64 Bouzari v. Iran, 114 A.C.W.S. 3d 57 ¶ 94.  
65 Orakhelashvili, supra note 61, at 258.  
66 A (FC) and others (FC) v. Secretary of State [2005] UKHL 71, ¶ 34 (Lord Bingham of Cornhill). 
67 Id. 
68 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Morris Kallon & Brimma Bazzy Kamara, SCSL-2004-15-AR72(E) & SCSL-
2004-16-AR72(E), Decision on Challenge to Jurisdiction: Amnesty Provided by the Lomé Accord, of 13 
March 2004, ¶ 71 (Mar. 13, 2004). 
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measures, violating the general principle and any treaty provision, would 
produce the legal effects discussed above and in addition would not be 
accorded international legal recognition. Proceedings could be initiated by 
potential victims if they had locus standi before a competent international 
or national judicial body with a view to asking it to hold the national 
measure to be internationally unlawful; or the victim could bring a civil 
suit for damage in a foreign court which would therefore be asked inter 
alia to disregard the legal value of the national authorizing act.”69 
However, it is significant to observe that the Trial Chamber considered that if victims of 
torture could bring a civil suit in foreign courts, they had no absolute right to do so: the 
necessary condition was for them to have locus standi. Similarly, in discussing the 
relationship between the jus cogens prohibition of genocide and the establishment of its 
jurisdiction, the ICJ held that “the fact that a dispute relates to compliance with a norm 
having such a character…cannot of itself provide a basis for the jurisdiction of the Court 
to entertain that dispute. Under the Court’s statute, that jurisdiction is always based on 
consent of the parties.”70 Admittedly, and as also underscored by the ICJ, jurisdiction and 
immunity are two distinct questions.71 However, these findings highlight that it is by no 
means established that the recognition of the peremptory character of a norm gives rise 
ipso facto to an obligation on states to enforce this norm under any circumstance.  
¶33 The need to keep the effect of jus cogens “within its proper limits” is 
acknowledged even by those defending the view that such effect is indiscriminate.72 If the 
jus cogens prohibition of torture or genocide, for example, was to entail a procedural rule 
overriding any obstacles to its enforcement, the immunity of incumbent high-ranking 
officials would be defeated as well. As a way to avoid “undue harassment for serving 
heads of State and foreign ministers,” it was suggested that in this context, “the 
postponement of accountability” could sometimes be compatible with the peremptory 
duty to prosecute prompted by the violation of substantive jus cogens.73 This remark 
implies that the overriding effects of the procedural ancillary rule would be variable: they 
could be suspended in certain (unspecified) circumstances. Such a suggestion, as well as 
the imposition of an implied procedural obligation whose exact features remain unclear, 
seem too far remote from the definition of the notion of jus cogens as “a norm accepted 
and recognized by the international community of States as a whole as a norm from 
which no derogation is permitted.”74 
¶34 This conclusion might appear difficult to reconcile with the international 
community’s absolute condemnation of the acts prohibited by jus cogens norms. As a 
result, and in order to affirm the “consequential profile” of jus cogens, some argue that 
the problem should be viewed in terms of the objective sought by peremptory norms, 
                                                 
69 See Prosecutor v. Furundžija, No. IT-95-17/1-T, (Dec. 10, 1998), ¶ 155, reprinted in 38 ILM 317 (1999), 
¶ 155. 
70 Armed Activities in the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), 
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, 2006 I.C.J. 6, (Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment of Feb. 
3), at ¶ 6432 (Feb. 3, 2006). 
71 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 13, at 20, ¶ 46. 
72 Orakhelashvili, supra note 61, at 265.  
73 Id. 
74 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5, Art. 53.  
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which is arguably broader: “[t]he function of peremptory norms in the field here under 
consideration is preventing impunity for serious breaches of human rights and 
humanitarian law.”75 Again, even if the prohibition of torture or genocide were to have 
that function, it is not clear how such an assertion suffices to endow it with peremptory 
status. This is not to say that a peremptory norm that prohibits impunity for serious 
breaches of human rights and humanitarian law could not arise independently, under the 
Vienna Convention’s definition of jus cogens. However, in the current state of 
international law, where the development of mechanisms sanctioning the commission of 
international crimes is not yet generalized, such a norm does not seem to have emerged. 
In the Arrest Warrant case, Judge Al-Khasawneh maintained in his dissenting opinion 
that “the effective combating of grave crimes” had now “arguably assumed a jus cogens 
character,” but this contention was made without further elaboration.76  
2. The “Complicity” Argument  
“The recognition of immunity for an act contrary to peremptory 
international law would amount to complicity of the national court to the 
promotion of an act strongly condemned by the international public 
order.”77 
¶35 Another argument in support of lifting the immunity of states and their officials 
builds on the consequences attached to the violation of jus cogens in the law of state 
responsibility.78 The reasoning goes as follows: since the ILC’s Draft Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts highlight the duty of states not 
to recognize breaches of peremptory norms and not to assist the breaching state, 79 
granting immunity would amount to complicity with the jus cogens violation and engage 
the responsibility of the forum state. The Italian Court of Cassation made a note of this 
point in support of its decision to deny Germany’s immunity for crimes committed during 
World War II.80 Similarly, in Prefecture of Voiotia, the Greek Court of First Instance 
asserted that “the recognition of immunity for an act contrary to peremptory international 
law would amount to complicity of the national court to the promotion of an act strongly 
condemned by the international public order.”81 
¶36 This argument is not without problems. The Draft Articles on State Responsibility 
stipulate that a state is internationally responsible when it aids, assists, directs, controls or 
                                                 
75 Orakhelashvili, supra note 60, at 970, 964.  
76 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 13, at 98, ¶ 7 (Diss. Op. of Judge Al-Khasawneh, J., dissenting).  
77 (Greece) Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, No. 137/1997 (Ct. 1st Inst. Levadia, Oct. 
30, 1997), translated in Maria Gavouneli, War Reparation Claims and State Immunity, 50 RHDI 595, 599 
(1997).  
78 On this argument, see, e.g., Giegerich, supra note 59, at 226; Caplan, supra note 59, at 775, 776; 
Orakhelashvili, supra note 61, at 967. 
79 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 19, art. 40, ¶¶ 4-
6.  
80 Ferrini, Decision No. 5044/2004, at 669, ¶ 9; see also, Pasquale De Sena & Francesca De Vittor, State 
Immunity and Human Rights: The Italian Supreme Court Decision on the Ferrini Case, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 
89, 100 (2005).  
81 Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, No. 137/1997 (Ct. 1st Inst. Levadia, Oct. 30, 
1997).  
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coerces another state into committing an internationally wrongful act, on the condition 
that it does so “with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful 
act.”82 A subsequent decision on adjudication, however, can hardly be considered an 
active participation in that wrongful act. In case of “serious breach by a State of an 
obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law,” the Draft 
Articles on State Responsibility also emphasize the particular duty of states to not 
“recognize as lawful” the situation created by such a breach.83 But the grant of immunity 
by the forum state does not amount to recognizing that the alleged acts were lawful: state 
immunity is a procedural rule, with no prejudice as to the determination of the 
substantive legal questions.84 Alternative judicial or political arenas remain open to 
establish whether a breach of jus cogens has occurred and recognize the responsibility of 
the perpetrator state. The following statement by Lord Hoffmann in the Jones case 
accurately reflects these points: “the United Kingdom, in according state immunity to the 
Kingdom [of Saudi Arabia], is not proposing to torture anyone. Nor is the Kingdom, in 
claiming immunity, justifying the use of torture. It is objecting in limine to the 
jurisdiction of the English court to decide whether it used torture or not.”85  
3. The “Qualification” Argument  
“Acts of the state in breach of peremptory international law cannot 
qualify as sovereign acts of state.”86 
¶37 Another claim that immunity should be denied in case of jus cogens violations 
relates to the conditions governing the grant of refusal of state immunity. It is often 
maintained that violations of jus cogens cannot be recognized as sovereign acts, since the 
violating state disregarded the one set of norms established by the community of states as 
a whole to safeguard its interests. State actions violating jus cogens would fall outside the 
category of state conduct protected by immunity (acta jure imperii); therefore, states 
ought not be granted immunity, as is the case with commercial transactions, for 
example.87 
¶38 This reasoning seems difficult to reconcile with the current categorizations 
governing the grant of immunity. When a state is impleaded before a foreign court, this 
court has to examine whether the state acted in the exercise of its sovereign powers (jure 
imperii) or like an ordinary legal person (jure gestionis): only the former category of acts 
are immune under international law. However, the abuse of sovereign prerogatives, as 
when the state violates jus cogens, “does not in itself transform sovereign acts into acta 
                                                 
82 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 19, arts. 16-18.  
83 Id. arts. 40, 41. 
84 This point was acknowledged by the ICJ in the context of the state officials’ immunity: “Immunity from 
criminal jurisdiction and individual criminal responsibility are quite separate concepts. While jurisdictional 
immunity is procedural in nature, criminal responsibility is a question of substantive law.” Arrest Warrant 
Case, supra note 13, ¶ 60.  
85 Jones, supra note 32, ¶¶ 44, 45 (Lord Hoffmann).  
86 Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, No. 137/1997 (Ct. 1st Inst. Levadia, Oct. 30, 
1997).  
87 On this argument, see, e.g., Belsky et al., supra note 2, at 378; Caplan, supra note 59, at 774-75; 
Orakhelashvili, supra note 61, at 236.  
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jure gestionis.”88 Such abuse is still performed in pursuance of the state’s governmental 
authority. The ILC’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts state it clearly: “The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity 
empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act 
of the State under international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, 
even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions.”89 Moreover, the approach 
that considers international crimes as “private acts” would eviscerate the responsibility of 
states for the crimes committed by their organs. The prohibition of torture illustrates this 
point: holding that the commission of torture cannot be considered as a sovereign act 
results in a contradiction, since like most human rights, the very definition of torture 
requires that the act be undertaken on behalf of or with the consent of the state.90  
¶39 The claim that jus cogens violations are by nature excluded from the category of 
immune conduct was also made with regard to the individual immunity of state officials: 
since these crimes can never be part of “normal state functions,” they would not qualify 
as “official” acts for the purpose of immunity ratione materiae.91 A number of national 
courts appear to endorse this argument. For example, in a case against a former Nazi 
officer involving war crimes and crimes against humanity, the Supreme Court of Israel 
held that because “such odious acts…are completely outside the ‘sovereign jurisdiction’ 
of the State that ordered or ratified their commission…those who participated in such acts 
must personally account for them and cannot shelter behind the official character of their 
task or mission, or behind the ‘Laws’ of the State by virtue of which they purported to 
act.”92 In the Pinochet case, two of the Law Lords supported this position.93 For example, 
Lord Hutton stated that “the commission of acts of torture is not a function of head of 
State, and therefore in this case the immunity to which Senator Pinochet is entitled as a 
former head of State does not arise in relation to, and does not attach to, acts of torture.”94 
Some U.S. courts, in particular, tend to regard violations of peremptory norms and other 
serious human rights abuses as outside the scope of the official’s authority.95  
¶40 An earlier analysis of the immunity of states applies here as well: it is difficult to 
maintain that non-official conduct, which under the effect of the law of immunity’s 
categorizations amounts by default to “private” conduct, still violates international law. 
To circumvent this problem, several U.S. courts have held that “[a]n official acting under 
                                                 
88 Giegerich, supra note 59, at 224. The point was recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Saudi Arabia 
v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993).  
89 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, supra note 19, art. 7 
(emphasis added).  
90 See the definition of torture entailed in CAT, supra note 22, art. 1.  
91 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 13, at 227, 228, ¶¶ 85 (Joint Sep. Op. of Judges Higgins et al.), quoting 
Andrea Bianchi, Denying State Immunity to Violators of Human Rights, 45 AUSTRIAN JOURNAL OF PUB. 
AND INT’L L. 195, 227-228 (1994).  
92 Attorney General v. Eichmann, Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 
Judgment of 29 May 1962, reproduced in 36 INT'L L. REP. 277, 310 (Sup. Ct. Israel 1962). 
93 See the opinions of Lord Hutton, Lord Browne-Wilkinson. Pinochet (No. 3) R., ex parte Pinochet Ugarte 
(Amnesty International Intervening) (No. 3) [2000] AC 147. 
94 Id.  
95 See, e.g., Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467 (9th Cir. 1994), where the Ninth Circuit 
found that acts of torture, summary execution, and disappearance could not be qualified as acts taken 
within an official mandate. Almost all cases against foreign states involving such violations, however, 
remain barred by immunity as a result of the U.S. codification governing foreign sovereign immunity. An 
analysis of jus cogens and foreign sovereign immunity in U.S. case law is provided below, at Section IV.C. 
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color of authority, but not within an official mandate, can violate international law and 
not be entitled to immunity...”96 But what happens when the state itself indicates that the 
unlawful acts were indeed performed in pursuance of an official mandate? The issue is 
not hypothetical: in the U.S., for instance, foreign states sometimes intervened on behalf 
of their officials to assert that the alleged actions had been carried out in an official 
capacity.97 A suitable answer is probably that international law does not allow jus cogens 
violations to be part of any official mandate, since these violations are by definition 
illegal. But an act “does not have to be lawful to attract immunity.”98 Immunity covers 
acts committed in pursuit of sovereign authority irrespective of their legality, as its 
rationale is to prevent other states from sitting in judgment over the acts of the other 
sovereign. As a result, “[i]f unlawful or criminal acts were considered, as a matter of 
principle, to be ‘non-official’ for purposes of immunity ratione materiae, the very notion 
of ‘immunity’ would be deprived of much of its content.”99 
 
4. The “Implied Waiver” Argument 
 “When a state is in breach of peremptory rules of international law, it 
cannot lawfully expect to be granted the right of immunity. Consequently, 
it is deemed to have tacitly waived such right.”100 
¶41 A variant of the reasoning that immunity should not be granted because jus cogens 
violations cannot be considered as sovereign acts maintains that states in breach of 
peremptory norms of international law have tacitly waived their right to immunity for 
such acts. Under international law, a state may make such an implied waiver if its intent 
is clearly discernable. Consequently, and as reflected by the JISP Convention, the 
existence of an implied waiver is made conditional upon some uncontroversial conduct, 
such as initiation or intervention in the proceedings.101 In case of jus cogens violations, 
the implied waiver argument can be described as follows: 
“The existence of a system of rules that states may not violate implies that 
when a state acts in violation of such a rule, the act is not recognized as a 
                                                 
96 Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 25 F.3d 1472 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F2d 876 (2d Cir 
1980)) (emphasis added); see also In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig. (Trajano v. Marcos), 978 
F.2d 493, 502 (9th Cir. 1992). 
97 In Samantar, 130 S. Ct. 2278 (2010), the Deputy Prime Minister of the Transitional Federal Government 
of Somalia (TGF) wrote a letter to the U.S. Secretary of State “reaffirming Samantar’s entitlement to 
immunity and ‘indicat[ing] that the actions attributed to Mr. Samantar in the lawsuit in connection with the 
quelling of the insurgencies from 1981 to 1989 would have been taken by Mr. Samantar in his official 
capacit[y]’ on behalf of Somalia.” A second letter by the TGF Prime Minister reiterating these points was 
sent again to the U.S. Secretary of State in April 2007. See Brief of Petitioner, Samantar v. Yousuf et al., 
2008 U.S. Briefs 1555 (U.S. Nov. 30, 2009). For another example, see, e.g., Belhas v. Moshe Ya'Alon, 515 
F.3d 1279, 1282 (D.D.C. 2008). 
98 Pinochet (No. 3) R., ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International Intervening) (No. 3) [2000] AC 
147. 
99 Immunity of State Officials from Foreign Criminal Jurisdiction, Memorandum, supra note 37, ¶ 160.  
100 Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, No. 137/1997 (Ct. 1st Inst. Levadia, Oct. 30, 
1997).  
101 JISP Covention, supra note 10, arts. 7(2), 8, 9.  
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sovereign act. When a state act is no longer recognized as sovereign, the 
state is no longer entitled to invoke the defense of sovereign immunity. 
Thus, in recognizing a group of peremptory norms, states are implicitly 
consenting to waive their immunity when they violate one of these 
norms.”102  
This reasoning has been upheld by the Greek Supreme Court in Prefecture of Voiotia.103 
However, the Italian Court of Cassation rejected it in the Ferrini case. For the Italian 
Court, this construction did not allow for an accurate interpretation of the state’s 
intention: “a renunciation [to immunity] cannot be construed on the basis of abstract 
conjecture, but must be based on concrete, ascertained facts which disclose a definite 
intention to ‘renounce.’”104 Far from being unequivocal, the Court found that, on the part 
of a state committing a serious breach of the law, such intention would be 
“improbable.”105 Moreover, in that case, the defending state had entered a plea of 
immunity: this manifestation of will patently undermines the validity of the legal fiction 
that immunity had been waived at the time of the breach. 
¶42 The fiction that a state implicitly waives its entitlement to immunity when it 
violates jus cogens has been asserted repeatedly before U.S. courts. However, as 
explained further infra, this theory was uniformly rejected on the grounds that the implied 
waiver provision in the statute governing foreign sovereign immunity had to be narrowly 
construed and required “strong evidence” of the state’s intention to waive its immunity, 
which could not be satisfied by the act of violation alone.106 As highlighted by the Italian 
Supreme Court in Ferrini, establishing a state’s willingness to waive its immunity in this 
context seems unworkable because it is difficult to conceive that a state which violates 
fundamental norms of international law would later indicate an intention to be sued for its 
crimes. A state’s acknowledgment of its wrongdoing does not imply its willingness to 
stand trial either. In a U.S. civil action, for instance, Libya conceded for the purpose of its 
appeal that its alleged participation in the bombing of a passenger aircraft would be a 
violation of jus cogens, but disputed the conclusion that such violation demonstrated an 
implied waiver of its immunity.107  
¶43 Beyond jus cogens, the implied waiver argument has also been sustained in relation 
to international treaties protecting human rights. Some commentators have argued that a 
state’s ratification of a human rights treaty with an obligation to provide for effective 
                                                 
102 Belsky et al., supra note 2, at 394. On this argument, see also, e.g., Giegriech, supra note 134 at 230; 
Magdalani Karagiannakis, State Immunity and Fundamental Human Rights, 11 Leiden J. INT’L L. 9, 20, 21 
(1998); JÉRÔME CANDRIAN, L’IMMUNITÉ DES ETATS FACE AUX DROITS DE L’HOMME ET À LA PROTECTION 
DES BIENS CULTURELS 721 (Schultess 2005); Caplan, supra note 59, at 755 (denying the existence of an 
implied waiver because “a foreign state’s entitlement to immunity for human rights violations is not 
derived from international law, so a foreign state cannot lose its right to immunity by violating international 
law”). 
103 Prefecture of Voiotia v. Federal Republic of Germany, No. 137/1997 521 (Ct. 1st Inst. Levadia, Oct. 30, 
1997); see also Gavouneli & Bantekas, supra note 30, at 200.  
104 See Ferrini, Decision No. 5044/2004, at 668, ¶ 8.2; see also De Sena & De Vittor, supra note 80, at 101, 
102. 
105 Ferrini, Decision No. 5044/2004, at 668, ¶ 8.2. 
106 See, e.g., Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, 250 F.3d 1145, 1150 (7th Cir. 2001). A more 
detailed analysis of jus cogens and the implied waiver provision of the FSIA can be found under Section 
IV.C of this article. 
107 See, e.g., Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 101 F.3d 239, 242 (2d Cir. 1996). 
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remedies would amount to an implied waiver of immunity before domestic courts, as the 
state has agreed to be bound by the legal standards set forth in the treaty.108 This 
reasoning seems implausible, since the obligation to provide effective remedies is usually 
limited to the state’s domestic court system only. It is therefore difficult to read in the 
state’s accession to such treaty the intention to allow foreign states courts to hear suits 
brought by private litigants. After a U.S. appellate court endorsed this argument, the 
Supreme Court rejected it when it specified that a state would waive its immunity by 
signing an international agreement only if that agreement would mention a waiver of 
immunity to suits in the U.S. or the availability of a cause of action.109  
¶44 The implied waiver theory was also disavowed with respect to a state’s acceptance 
of an instrument implicating that state officials could be subject to criminal proceedings 
in another jurisdiction. By acceding to the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), each state agrees that other state 
parties exercise jurisdiction over alleged official torturers found within their territories, 
by extraditing them or referring them to their own appropriate authorities for 
prosecution.110 However, in the Pinochet case, the majority of the Law Lords denied that 
this was a case of implied waiver.111 For example, Lord Millet found that because under 
Article 1 of the CAT, torture “can be committed only by or at the instigation of or with 
the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity,” … “there was no immunity to be waived [because t]he offence is one which 
could only be committed in circumstances which would normally give rise to the 
immunity.”112 Conversely, other Law Lords took the view that since torture could not be 
considered an official act, immunity ratione materiae was not available in the first place. 
Consequently, an immunity waiver was not applicable.113 In his opinion, Lord Goff of 
Chieveley highlighted one of the main concerns at issue with the theory of implied 
waiver: “there could well be international chaos as the courts of different state parties to a 
treaty reach different conclusions on the question whether a waiver of immunity was to 
be implied.”114 
                                                 
108 See Bianchi, supra note 91, at 213, 214; Jordan J. Paust, Draft Brief Concerning Claims to Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity and Human Rights: Non-immunity for Violations of International Law Under the 
FSIA, 8 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 40, 65, 66 (1985). 
109 See Von Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 736 F. Supp. 1, 176 (D.D.C. 1990), quoting  
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 441-42.  
110 See CAT, supra note 22, arts. 5, 7.  
111 Of the seven Law Lords, Lord Saville of Newdigate was the only one holding that the ratification of the 
CAT amounted to a waiver of immunity. In his view, this waiver was express. See Pinochet (No. 3) R., ex 
parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International Intervening) (No. 3) [2000] AC 147. 
112 Id. (Lord Millet). For a similar argument, see also the opinion of Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers. Id. 
at 924.  
113 See the opinion of Lord Hutton in Pinochet (No. 3) R., ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International 
Intervening) (No. 3) [2000] AC 147; for a similar argument, see also the opinion of Lord Browne-
Wilkinson. Id. at 846, 847.  
114 Pinochet (No. 3) R., ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International Intervening) (No. 3) [2000] AC 
147 (Lord Goff of Chieveley).  
Vol. 9:2] SÉVRINE KNUCHEL 169 
 
5. The “Universal Jurisdiction” Argument 
 “Once extra-territorial jurisdiction is established, it makes no sense to 
exclude from it acts done in an official capacity.”115 
¶45 State immunity has also come to be challenged on the grounds that it is 
incompatible with the principle of universal jurisdiction associated with jus cogens 
violations.116 As peremptory norms are a matter of concern to all states, every state has an 
interest in repressing their violations. Therefore, international law has come to recognize 
that states could lawfully exercise jurisdiction over these violations even without 
territorial or nationality linkage.117 Historically, states relied on this notion to assert 
jurisdiction over crimes like piracy which occur on the high sea.118 For the safeguard of 
the interests of the international community, it is argued that states should be able to 
exercise the prerogative of universal jurisdiction over breaches of jus cogens committed 
by another state or its officials.  
¶46 The conflict between the establishment of universal jurisdiction and the assertion of 
immunity was underlined by several of the Law Lords in the Pinochet case. As the CAT 
requires state parties to ensure either that they are in a position to prosecute cases of 
torture wherever they may have occurred, or to extradite alleged offenders to other states 
having jurisdiction over them, some of the Law Lords reasoned that the immunity ratione 
materiae of a former head of state was abrogated by that regime.119 For example, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson stated that if immunity ratione materiae would be recognized for 
state officials, “…the whole elaborate structure of universal jurisdiction over torture 
committed by officials [would be] rendered abortive and one of the main objectives of the 
Torture Convention—to provide a system under which there is no safe haven for 
torturers—[would be] frustrated.”120 Similarly, for Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, 
“[i]nternational crimes and extra-territorial jurisdiction in relation to them are both new 
arrivals in the field of public international law. I do not believe that state immunity 
ratione materiae can co-exist with them.”121 
¶47 The argument that immunity is incompatible with the states’ entitlement to extend 
their jurisdiction over the crimes threatening the international community’s interests is 
compelling. The “underlying idea” of universal jurisdiction can be defined as “a common 
endeavor in the face of atrocities.”122 To fulfill this commitment, every state is equally 
entitled to exercise jurisdiction over the violation, because of its universal condemnation. 
                                                 
115 Id. at 924 (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers). 
116 On this argument, see, e.g., Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International Criminal 
Court, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 407, 415 (2004); Orakhelashvili, supra note 60, at 960-64; International Law 
Association, supra note 52, at 416.  
117 See, e.g., Donovan & Roberts, supra note 60, at 143.  
118 This customary principle was later codified in international conventions. See, e.g., art. 19 of the Geneva 
Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 UST 2312, 450 UNTS 82; art. 105 of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, 21 ILM 1261. 
119 See Pinochet (No. 3) R., ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International Intervening) (No. 3) [2000] 
AC 147 (opinions of Lord Browne-Wilkinson, Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers, Lord Hope of Craighead, 
and Lord Saville of Newdigate). 
120 Id. at 847-48 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson). 
121Id. at 924 (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers). 
122Arrest Warrant case, supra note 13, ¶ 51 (Joint Sep. Op. of Judge Higgins et al.). 
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In these circumstances, the principle that one state will not intervene in the internal 
affairs of another becomes defeated by the prevailing interest of the community. 
Consequently, immunity loses its purpose. This view, however, was not adopted by the 
ICJ. In the Arrest Warrant case, the Court indicated that the rules governing jurisdiction 
and the ones governing immunity should be “carefully distinguished”, and specified that: 
“[A]lthough various international conventions on the prevention and 
punishment of certain serious crimes impose on States’ obligations of 
prosecution or extradition, thereby requiring them to extend their criminal 
jurisdiction, such extension of jurisdiction in no way affects immunities 
under customary international law, including those of Ministers for 
Foreign Affairs. These remain opposable before the courts of a foreign 
state, even where those courts exercise such a jurisdiction under these 
conventions.”123 
Admittedly, the Court only referred to universal jurisdiction authorized under treaty law. 
As these conventions do not expressly provide for the abrogation of immunity, the Court 
seemed to imply that drawing such a conclusion would overstretch the rules on treaty 
interpretation.124 However, customary international law does not allow for such a 
conclusion either, at least in its present state. In the Arrest Warrant case, three Judges 
examined the practice of states with regard to the exercise of universal jurisdiction in 
their joint separate opinion. They concluded that such a practice was “neutral.”125 While 
nothing in the case law evidences an opinio juris on the illegality of such a jurisdiction, 
its exercise remains marginal. Because states have not generally asserted universal 
jurisdiction over international crimes, it would be premature to declare that state 
immunity has been rendered obsolete. This does not mean that the situation will not 
evolve. In their separate opinion, the Judges acknowledged the existence of “striking” 
contemporary trends toward the extension of jurisdiction based on the heinous nature of 
the alleged violation.126 Notably, they observed that universal criminal jurisdiction for 
certain international crimes was “clearly not regarded as unlawful.”127 As for civil 
matters, they noted that the Alien Tort Statute, which allows U.S. courts to adjudicate 
violations of international law perpetrated by non-nationals overseas, marked “the 
beginnings of a very broad form of extraterritorial jurisdiction,” even if so far this form of 
jurisdiction “has not attracted the approbation of States generally.”128 
                                                 
123 Id. ¶ 59. 
124 See Section 3 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 5. 
125 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 13, at 76, ¶ 45 (Joint Sep. Op. of Judge Higgins et al.); for a similar 
conclusion, see also the Separate Opinion of President Guillaume in the same case, supra note 12, at 40- 
42, ¶ 12. 
126 Arrest Warrant Case, supra note 13, at 76, ¶ 47 (Joint Sep. Op. of Judge Higgins et al.). 
127 Id.  ¶ 46 (emphasis added). 
128 Id. at 77, ¶ 48. On the Alien Tort Statute, see infra, Section IV.B. 
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6. The “Pinochet” Argument 
“The most significant use of jus cogens as a conflict norm has been by the 
British House of Lords in the Pinochet case.”129 
¶48 This observation was made by the ILC in its report on the fragmentation of 
international law, which further underlines that “for the first time [in the Pinochet case] a 
local domestic court denied immunity to a former head of state on the grounds that there 
cannot be any immunity against prosecution for breach of jus cogens.”130 As mentioned 
above, jus cogens undoubtedly figures among the elements considered by the Law Lords, 
but several aspects cast doubt on whether its use as a conflict norm was the true ratio 
decidendi in the case.131 The majority of the Law Lords held that immunity ratione 
materiae did not cover the acts of torture imputable to Augusto Pinochet committed after 
December 8, 1988, the date the United Kingdom ratified the CAT. For most of the Law 
Lords, the ratification of the CAT by all the relevant state parties in the case and the 
expansive regime of jurisdiction established by this instrument seem to have been 
conclusive, rather than jus cogens proper.132 For instance, Lord Browne-Wilkinson 
expressly voiced his doubts as to “whether, before the coming into force of the Torture 
Convention, the existence of the international crime of torture as jus cogens was enough 
to justify the conclusion that the organization of state torture could not rank for immunity 
purposes as performance of an official function.”133 Noting the need for “an international 
system which could punish those who were guilty of torture and which did not permit the 
evasion of punishment by the torturer,” he concluded that “[t]he Torture Convention did 
provide what was missing: a worldwide universal jurisdiction.”134  
¶49 Also, some of the Law Lords who acknowledged the peremptory nature of the 
prohibition of torture asserted at the same time that serving heads of state or state 
officials could still claim immunity if they were accused of such a crime.135 Such 
contention is problematic: if the superior status of jus cogens as a conflict norm could 
override the immunity of state officials who had vacated office, why would it not 
override the immunity of an incumbent official?136 Similarly, several Law Lords who 
                                                 
129 Report of the Study Group of the ILC Int’l Law Comm’n on the Fragmentation of International Law, 
58th sess, May 1-June 9, July 3-Aug.11, 2006, ¶ 370, 13 April 2006, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682, (Apr. 13, 
2006).  
130 Id. ¶ 371. 
131 For an analysis and discussion of the case, see, e.g., Christine M. Chinkin, United Kingdom House of 
Lords, (Spanish request for extradition). Regina v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate and 
Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3). [1999] 2 WLR 827, 93 AM. J. INT’ L. 703 (1999); Andrea 
Bianchi, Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 237 (1999); Jean-Yves de 
Cara, L’affaire Pinochet devant la Chambre des Lords, (1999) 45 AFDI 72; Kerry C. O’Neill, A New 
Customary Law of Head of State Immunity?: Hirohito and Pinochet, 38 STAN J. INT’L L. 289 (2002). 
132 The state parties in the case were: Chile (state of nationality), Spain (state requesting Augusto 
Pinochet’s extradition) and the United Kingdom (forum state). 
133 Pinochet (No. 3) R., ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International Intervening) (No. 3) [2000] AC 
147(Lord Brown-Wilkinson); see also, id. at 881 (Lord Hope) (“But even in the field of such high crimes 
as have achieved the status of jus cogens under customary international law there is as yet no general 
agreement that they are outside the immunity to which former heads of state are entitled from the 
jurisdiction of foreign national courts.”); id. at 911-913 (Lord Millet); id. at 899 (Lord Hutton). 
134 Id. at 841, 847 (Lord Brown-Wilkinson) (emphasis added). 
135 See, id. at 912 (Lord Millet); id. at 915, 916 (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers). 
136 This position is difficult to sustain even when one holds that immunity was defeated as an effect of the 
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pointed out to the acts of torture as violating jus cogens made comments supporting state 
immunity in civil proceedings.137 If the special nature of the prohibition of torture was 
able to defeat immunity, it is difficult to understand why this effect would be restricted to 
criminal proceedings only. 
¶50 These observations are not directed against the holding in the case, nor do they 
intend to undermine the significance of the House of Lords’ decision in the process of 
bringing those responsible for serious abuses to a court of law. Surely, the peremptory 
character of the prohibition of torture influenced the result reached by the Law Lords. But 
it does not seem to have done so as a conflict norm with the specific effect of defeating 
state immunity. Rather, the importance attached to the fact that the prohibition of torture 
is universally recognized as being fundamental for the international community appears 
to have been one reason, among others, compelling the deviation from regular practice 
toward carving a new exception in the rules governing immunity. 
7. Jus Cogens and the Dynamics of International Law 
“The recognition of immunity from jurisdiction for States responsible for 
such misdeeds …does not assist, but rather impedes, the protection of 
those norms and principles which are considered by the community of 
nations to be so essential as to justify mandatory measures in response to 
serious violations.”138 
¶51 In a number of cases, jus cogens seems to provide courts with a basis for arguing 
against immunity for serious abuses committed by foreign states or their officials. The 
decision of the Italian Court of Cassation in Ferrini illustrates that approach. In that case, 
the Court appears to have relied on jus cogens not as a conflict rule, but rather as a means 
of highlighting the seriousness of the acts committed by the foreign state, so as to justify 
the denial of immunity.139 After underlining the gravity of international crimes which 
“threaten the whole humanity and undermine the foundations of peaceful international 
relations,” the Court went on to observe that “the recognition of immunity from 
jurisdiction for States responsible for such misdeeds…does not assist, but rather impedes, 
the protection of those norms which are considered by the community of nations to be so 
essential…”140 For the Court, the characterization of jus cogens appears to be one 
element which supports “the priority status, which…now attaches to the protection of 
fundamental human rights over and above the protection of States interests through the 
recognition of immunity from foreign jurisdiction.”141 This echoes the Pinochet case, 
                                                                                                                                                 
CAT’s regime. As the CAT criminalizes torture without distinguishing between current or former state 
officials, one does not see why the abrogation of immunity induced by its regime should make this 
distinction.  
137 Pinochet (No. 3) R., ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (Amnesty International Intervening) (No. 3) [2000] AC 
147, at 891, 892 (Lord Hutton), at 916 (Lord Phillips of Worth Matravers), at 914 (Lord Millet). 
138 Ferrini, Decision No. 5044/2004, at 669, ¶ 9.1. 
139 See also, De Sena & De Vittor, supra note 80, at 102 (asserting that in Ferrini, the notion of jus cogens 
was “not used in strictly normative or formal terms”). 
140 Ferrini, Decision No. 5044/2004, at 668-69, ¶  9-9.1. 
141 Id. at 673, ¶10.2. 
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where the serious nature of the crime of torture and its universal condemnation seem to 
have been one strong factor, albeit among others, which led to the denial of immunity.  
¶52 In these cases, courts appeal to the peremptory character of the norm infringed as a 
reason to justify the departure from the existing rules on foreign sovereign immunity. The 
significance of jus cogens for the international community is used to demonstrate the 
need for a change in the law. The denial of immunity is substantiated by the preeminence 
of the violated rule and its underlying values: the status of underogable norm is recited to 
legitimize the submission of the state or its official to the jurisdiction of another state. In 
this context, jus cogens contributes to a “custom-generation process.”142 The denial of 
immunity is not an effect elicited by the peremptory norm. Rather, jus cogens affords a 
ground on which to base that denial, which, if followed by future state practice, might 
transform into a new rule of customary international law. 
¶53 The reliance on jus cogens to direct a change of practice with regard to sovereign 
immunity seems an admissible use of these norms. An evolution in the rules on sovereign 
immunity, this time to accommodate considerations derived from jus cogens, would be 
no unprecedented event. When states began to engage more frequently in business 
transactions, domestic courts carved the commercial activity exception so as to protect 
the rights of private parties. In response to the changing features of international 
relations, national courts reinterpreted the meaning of the longstanding maxim “par in 
parem no habet imperium” in light of the deeper engagement of states in private 
transactions. The sovereignty of states was not denied, but the effects flowing from this 
legal status were reappraised to give way to basic considerations of fairness.  
¶54 This process indicates that the normative implications of sovereignty are not 
immutable. The sovereignty of states is no “brute fact,” as some might conceive it.143 
Rather, sovereignty is more accurately defined as “a complex of various forms of power 
and independence…that a state needs in order to be a good state.”144 Jus cogens norms, 
as essential normative tenets recognized by the international community of states as a 
whole, are indicative of what count as “a good state.” A good state serves the people of 
its territory without committing torture, for example. Peremptory norms (along with other 
considerations) contribute to the delineation of the forms of powers and independence 
that compose state sovereignty. Is the practice of immunizing a state and its officials from 
the jurisdiction of foreign courts a form of independence that is necessary for the state to 
be a good state? In case of proceedings arising from the violation of norms that are 
universally recognized as essential, the answer is far from a foregone conclusion. As 
early as 1951, a commentator expressed doubts on this point:  
“At a period in which in enlightened communities the securing of the 
rights of the individual, in all their aspects, against the state has become a 
matter of special and significant effort, there is no longer a disposition to 
tolerate the injustice which may arise whenever the state – our own state 
                                                 
142 Carlo Focarelli, Promotional Jus Cogens: A Critical Appraisal of Jus Cogens’ Legal Effects, 77 NORDIC 
J. OF INT’L L. 429, 457 (2008). I adopt Focarelli’s term on a descriptive basis only, without endorsing the 
author’s views on its consequences for jus cogens and the birth of international law. 
143 John Tasioulas, In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communitarian values and the Nicaragua Case, 16 
OXFORD J. OF LEGAL STUD. 85, 120 (1996) (opposing different conceptions of sovereignty). 
144 Timothy Endicott, The Logic of Freedom and Power, in THE PHIL. OF INT’L L., 245, 252 (Samantha 
Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010). 
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or a foreign state—screens itself behind the shield of immunity in order to 
defeat a legitimate claim.”145 
It is therefore not surprising for jus cogens to be invoked in the process of reshaping the 
scope of foreign sovereign immunity. Whether state practice will generally engage in this 
process is yet to be seen. 
8. Overall Appraisal  
¶55 Although jus cogens has often been invoked to defeat the shield of immunity, the 
foregoing analysis reveals that this notion does not itself demand that foreign states be 
denied immunity when brought before the courts of another state. The jus cogens norms 
usually invoked by victims, like the prohibition of torture, are substantive norms: they 
prohibit a definite type of conduct. Yet their superior rank in the emerging hierarchy of 
international rules does not secure an automatic access to justice to enforce their 
prohibitions or automatically void any procedural obstacles to their adjudication. This 
conclusion may seem puzzling. As one commentator asked, “Why should a norm be 
specific in nature because of embodying community interest and yet be unable to produce 
specific consequences to safeguard the integrity of that community interest?”146 But jus 
cogens, as highlighted by the Vienna Convention, does produce a specific consequence 
by nonderogably “depriving any act or situation which is in conflict with it of legality.”147 
To date, however, international law does not recognize a peremptory rule safeguarding 
the right of victims of jus cogens violations to a judicial remedy in the courts of another 
state. A direct conflict with the procedural bar of state immunity, therefore, has not 
occurred. 
¶56 So far, the international rules on foreign sovereign immunity do not entail an 
exception for the violation of peremptory norms. But legal evolution in this area has not 
been foreclosed. Jus cogens may play a role in this evolution by buttressing the view that 
such an exception is necessary because it is in line with the values incorporated by the 
international community in a higher legal category. Using jus cogens to support the 
contention that immunity is not warranted for international crimes like torture is a 
permissible use of that notion. It seems more appropriate than the implied waiver 
construction, which relies on a legal fiction that is more clever than principled, and which 
comes close to a “straining of the truth.”148 It must also be distinguished from the use of 
jus cogens as a conflict norm, which, as explained above, is currently not triggered in the 
context of immunity. Finally, it is also different from the claim that violations of 
peremptory norms are not sovereign acts: as discussed above, that argument is untenable 
because such violations are, by definition, committed in the exercise of sovereign 
authority. This conclusion should not be read as depriving victims from a tool in their 
struggle to obtain reparation for their injuries. By admitting that the denial of immunity is 
not a direct consequence of jus cogens, but that peremptory norms provide a compelling 
                                                 
145 Lauterpacht, supra note 2, at 235. 
146 Orakhelashvili, supra note 61, at 257. 
147 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries, 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, 1966 261, U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1966/Add.1. 
148 De Sena & De Vittor, supra note 80, at 102. 
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reason for states to depart from existing practice, one can frame a claim that is compatible 
with that normative category and therefore most likely to be adopted by courts. 
IV. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND JUS COGENS VIOLATIONS BEFORE U.S. COURTS: 
WHICH PROSPECTS AFTER SAMANTAR?  
¶57 This Section examines how U.S. courts have dealt with cases involving foreign 
sovereign immunity and jus cogens violations. It first introduces the legal framework of 
immunity law in the U.S. and highlights the issues raised by the litigation of cases 
involving human rights violations such as Samantar. It then reviews relevant case law 
where litigants have invoked jus cogens to defeat foreign sovereign immunity and 
discusses how such cases can be expected to fare after Samantar.  
A. Foreign Sovereign Immunity under U.S. Law 
¶58 Since 1976, the U.S. approach to state immunity has been governed by the Foreign 
Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), a statutory framework which provides “the sole basis 
for obtaining jurisdiction over a foreign state in the courts of this country.”149 This statute 
codifies into law the ‘restrictive approach’ to state immunity, which holds that no 
immunity will be recognized for the commercial or ‘private law’ activities of foreign 
states.   
¶59 The FSIA postulates the immunity of the foreign state from jurisdiction as a general 
principle, except as otherwise provided in the statute or in an international agreement to 
which the United States is a party at the time of its enactment.150 Section 1605 of the 
FSIA enumerates six exceptions to immunity: (1) cases where immunity has been waived 
by the state; (2) commercial activities; (3) non-commercial torts occurring in the U.S.; (4) 
maritime property in rem; (5) real property and estates; and (6) foreign expropriations (in 
certain circumstances).151 In 1996, Congress added another exception for certain terrorist 
acts. This exception applies only to the suits brought by U.S. nationals against a state 
‘designated as a state sponsor of terrorism’, or against officials of such state.152 Regarding 
attachment and execution, the FSIA generally preserves the immunity of the foreign 
state’s property, with a number of limited exceptions for state property in commercial 
use.153  
¶60 On the international level, the U.S. participated actively in the development of the 
JISP Convention. Although it has not yet signed or ratified this instrument, the U.S. has 
described it as “a very substantial achievement in an increasingly important and rapidly 
developing area of international law and practice.”154 For the U.S., “[t]he text of the draft 
Convention reflect[s] an emerging global consensus that States and State enterprises 
[can] no longer claim absolute, unfettered immunity from the proper jurisdiction of 
                                                 
149 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443 (1989). 
150 See 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (2011). 
151 Respectively, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605(a)(1) (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2) (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) 
(2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(b) (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(4) (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3) (2011). 
152 See 28 U.S.C. § 1605A (2011). 
153 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1610 (2011); 28 U.S.C. § 1611 (2011). 
154 Statement of the Representative of the United States before the 6th Committee of the UNGA, 24 October 
2004, U.N. GAOR, 59th Sess., 13th mtg. at ¶ 58, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/59/SR.13 (Oct. 25, 2004). 
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foreign courts and agencies, especially for their commercial activities.”155 Despite 
concerns about the “insufficiently clear and precise wording of the text” in some places, 
or the “gaps, omissions, ambiguities and inconsistencies” entailed in certain articles, the 
U.S. nevertheless took the position that the JISP Convention “would provide a solid 
foundation on which all Member States could base their domestic law” and create “a 
greater measure of harmonization and compatibility between domestic law and 
practice.”156 
B. International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts and the Hurdle of Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity 
1. International Human Rights Litigation in U.S. Courts 
¶61 Since the 1980s, numerous lawsuits involving human rights violations committed 
throughout the world have been filed in U.S. courts. These suits are usually based on the 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS) which enables non-U.S. citizens to sue in U.S. courts for torts 
“committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”157 In 1991, 
after the U.S. had signed the CAT, Congress enacted another statutory basis for human 
rights litigation in U.S. courts: the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA).158 This Act, 
which does not supplant the ATS, codifies a cause of action available to both citizens and 
non-citizens for torture and extrajudicial killing committed by foreign officials. However, 
in some respects, “the TVPA is more limited than the [ATS]”: the TVPA allows suits 
against individual defendants only, and applies exclusively to torture and extrajudicial 
killings, whereas the ATS is not restricted to these torts and allows suits against 
individuals as well as states, corporations, and other legal entities.159 
¶62 While many observers approved of human rights litigation as an additional avenue 
to give effect to human rights norms, others voiced concerns that this development might 
not be wholly positive or justified. For example, some feared that ATS litigation might be 
detrimental to U.S. foreign relations, as it “shifts responsibility for official condemnation 
and sanction of foreign governments away from elected political officials to private 
plaintiffs and their representatives” who “have neither the expertise nor the constitutional 
authority to determine US foreign policy.”160 This concern was shared by the Government, 
which warned of the “serious consequences for both the development and expression of 
the Nation's foreign policy” implicated by the recognition of a private right of action for 
international human rights violations under the ATS.161 A number of commentators further 
                                                 
155 Id. 
156 Id.  ¶ 61. 
157 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2011). 
158 Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (note) (2011)). 
159 Tom Lininger, Overcoming Immunity Defenses to Human Rights Suits in U.S. Courts, 7 HARV. HUM. 
RTS. J. 177, 182 (1994). 
160 Curtis A. Bradley, The Costs of International Human Rights Litigation, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 457, 460 
(2001). 
161 See Brief for the United States as Respondent in Supporting of the Petitioner at 7, Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No 03-339) (quoting Andrew Farrelly, Foreign Policy in the Courts – The 
ATCA and In Re South African Apartheid Litigation: What Sosa Makes Courts Do, 30 SETON HALL LEGIS. 
J. 437, 463 (2006)).  
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argued that international human rights litigation in U.S. courts was “illegitimate.”162 In 
their view, the ongoing ATS litigation rests on the false proposition that in the U.S., 
customary international law is automatically incorporated into federal law.163 This 
“revisionist” argument was defeated when the Supreme Court, in its 2004 case Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain, confirmed that the ATS provided federal court jurisdiction over claims 
based on clearly defined customary international law norms.164  
2. Foreign Sovereign Immunity as a Bar to Human Rights Litigation 
¶63 The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity creates a “potentially dispositive 
objection” to the litigation of human rights violations involving foreign states or foreign 
officials.165 In the U.S., any human rights case against a foreign state must satisfy one of 
the FSIA’s exceptions to immunity, since this statute provides the sole basis for obtaining 
jurisdiction over a foreign state. However, as highlighted above, the FSIA entails no 
specific exception for human rights cases. If a number of suits involving murders 
committed in the U.S. by agents of foreign governments were found admissible under the 
tort exception, that exception is not applicable to tortious activity occurring abroad.166 
Some plaintiffs attempted to use the commercial activity exception, but found little 
success.167 To date, violations of human rights by foreign states are most likely to be 
adjudicated under the ‘terrorism exception’, which encompasses torture, extrajudicial 
killing, aircraft sabotage, hostage-taking, or the provision of material support or resources 
for such an act.168 However, this exception will only apply to a limited number of cases, 
since the victim or claimant needs to be a U.S. national and the foreign state must be 
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism.169 
¶64 In contrast to cases brought against foreign states, human rights cases against 
individual foreign officials do not have to fit within one of the FSIA’s exceptions, 
because the statute is not applicable to their immunity claims. The Supreme Court held in 
the recent case of Samantar that foreign officials may be entitled to immunity from suits, 
but under the common law and not by way of the FSIA statute.170 However, the Court did 
not specify the scope of the common law immunity of a former official accused of 
serious human rights violations, leaving the question to be addressed on remand by the 
district court. Before Samantar, a majority of Circuits had held that individual officials 
                                                 
162 See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Current Illegitimacy Of International Human 
Rights Litigation, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 319 (1997-1998). 
163 See id. at 320-25. 
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165 Curtis Bradley & Jack Goldsmith, Foreign Sovereign Immunity, Individual Officials And Human Rights 
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166 See, e.g., Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 488 F. Supp. 665 (D.D.C 1980); Liu v. Republic of China, 892 
F.2d 1419 (9th Cir. 1989). 
167 See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993) (where the Supreme Court rejected application of 
the commercial exception to a case involving allegations of torture committed abroad in retaliation for 
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were covered by the FSIA when acting in an official capacity.171 Eventually, however, 
the same courts came to deny immunity in cases involving human rights violations on the 
grounds that such abuses were by nature excluded from the scope of official authority.172 
For example, in 1992 in Trajano v. Marcos, the following test of attribution was applied 
to the defendant accused of having authorized the kidnapping, torture and murder of the 
petitioner’s son in the Philippines:  
The FSIA covers a foreign official acting in an official capacity, but that 
official is not entitled to immunity for acts which are not committed in an 
official capacity (such as selling personal property), and for acts beyond 
the scope of her authority (for example, doing something the sovereign has 
not empowered the official to do).173  
In cases implicating heads of states, courts have traditionally deferred to the Executive 
Branch’s judgment as to whether immunity should be granted. Under this common law 
regime, human rights cases against incumbent heads of state have all been dismissed 
consistent with executive suggestions, in order to “promote international comity and 
respect among sovereign nations by ensuring that leaders are free to perform their 
governmental duties…”174 
C. Jus Cogens Versus Foreign Sovereign Immunity in U.S. Courts 
¶65 Jus cogens has often been invoked in U.S. courts to contest assertions of foreign 
sovereign immunity. In suits against foreign states, the “normative hierarchy” argument  
(see supra Section III.C.1) was raised in Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 
where the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recognized that “any state that engages 
in official torture violates jus cogens.”175 Although the court admitted that “[a]s a matter 
of international law, the [plaintiffs’] argument carries much force,” it also emphasized 
that it could “not write on a clean slate” since it had to “deal not only with customary 
international law, but with an affirmative Act of Congress, the FSIA.”176 Because the 
Supreme Court had held in Argentine Republic v Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. that the 
FSIA did not entail an implied exception for claims alleging violations of international 
law, the court rejected the “normative hierarchy” argument.177 The court’s reasoning puts 
in stark relief issues related to the interaction between international and domestic law. If 
                                                 
171 Chuidian v. Philippine Nat. Bank, 912 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Terrorist Attacks on 
September 11, 2001, 538 F.3d 71, 83 (2d Cir. 2008); Keller v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 277 F.3d 811, 815 
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172 See, e.g., Hilao v. Marcos (In re Estate of Marcos), 25 F.3d 1467, 1472 (9th Cir. 1994); Xuncax v. 
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 176 (D. Mass. 1995); Cabiri v. Assasie-Gyimah, 921 F. Supp. 1189, 1197, 
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175 See, e.g., Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, 965 F.2d 699, 717-19 (9th Cir. 1992) (torture). 
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the requirements of the doctrine of state immunity are determined under international 
law, the decisions by national courts called upon to adjudicate claims against a foreign 
state or a foreign official are made within their individual national legal order. If the 
national legal system does not allow for the seamless integration of international rules, 
claims derived from the superior status of peremptory norms of international law may not 
carry their full force. In Siderman, the court gave precedence to its domestic law on 
foreign sovereign immunity, but the result might have been different if the court had been 
able to disregard the statute in favor of its interpretation of customary international law. 
¶66 In order to circumvent the Amerada Hess ruling, litigants resorted to the “implied 
waiver argument” (see supra Section III.C.4) and asserted that the violation by a foreign 
state of a peremptory norm of international law amounted to an implied waiver under the 
FSIA. Although the argument was at times characterized as “appealing,” courts have 
refused to expand the meaning of the FSIA’s implied waiver so as to include violations of 
peremptory norms.178 For example, in Princz v. Germany, where a Holocaust survivor 
brought suit against the Federal Republic of Germany to recover damages for injuries and 
slave labor in concentration camps, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found the 
jus cogens theory of implied waiver incompatible with the intentionality requirement 
which must be read into the implied waiver provision of the FSIA.179 Whereas one judge 
found in his dissent that “Germany implicitly waived its immunity by engaging in the 
barbaric conduct alleged in this case,” the majority disagreed and found that an implied 
waiver under the FSIA required “that either the present government of Germany or the 
predecessor government of the Third Reich actually indicate…even implicitly, a 
willingness to waive immunity for actions arising out of the Nazi atrocities.”180 The 
implied waiver argument was also rejected by the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit on the grounds that Congress had not contemplated jus cogens violations when it 
enacted the FSIA’s implied waiver exception.181 In a later case with a fact pattern similar 
to Princz, an amicus brief filed in support of the plaintiff argued that jus cogens 
violations should nevertheless be construed as an implied waiver under the FSIA because 
the statute had to be interpreted in conformity with international law.182 However, the 
Charming Betsy principle that U.S. statutes should be interpreted if possible to avoid 
violation of international law did not allow for the “implied waiver” argument to succeed. 
In Sampson v. Federal Republic of Germany, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit considered that the Charming Betsy canon was not relevant to the case. For the 
court “since jus cogens norms do not require Congress (or any government) to create 
jurisdiction,” a narrow interpretation of the implied waiver provision was not at risk to 
conflict with international law.183 The court denied that the Charming Betsy canon 
required that the statute be interpreted in conformity with the content of international law, 
explaining in particular that such an expansive reading could interfere with the foreign 
policy decisions of the other branches of the government and create tensions since the 
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case involved jurisdiction over a foreign sovereign.184 Like Siderman, this case highlights 
the bearing which the issue of the reception of international law might have on courts’ 
approach to cases involving jus cogens violations.  
¶67 In the context of suits against foreign officials, some courts have endorsed the 
“qualification argument” (see supra Section III.C.3). They held that violations of 
peremptory norms of international law were beyond the scope of official authority since 
no state is ever allowed to derogate from jus cogens. In these cases, individual officials 
were denied immunity under the FSIA, which was deemed to extend to individuals only 
when they acted in an official capacity.185 The flaws of the “qualification argument” 
however, were highlighted by the Supreme Court in a case involving the immunity of a 
foreign state. While the plaintiff contended that acts of torture committed in retaliation 
for business related complaints should fall under the commercial activity exception of the 
FSIA, the Court objected as follows: 
“[T]he intentional conduct alleged here (the Saudi Government’s wrongful 
arrest, imprisonment and torture of the plaintiff) could not qualify as 
commercial under the restrictive theory [of foreign sovereign immunity]. 
The conduct boils down to abuse of the power of its police by the Saudi 
Government, and however monstrous such abuse undoubtedly may be, a 
foreign state’s exercise of the power of its police has long been understood 
for purposes of the restrictive theory as peculiarly sovereign in nature.”186 
D. Prospects After Samantar 
¶68 In Samantar, the Supreme Court held that the FSIA is not applicable to foreign 
officials: foreign officials’ immunity claims have to be decided under the common law.187 
As for now, it is unclear whether the common law immunity of foreign officials will 
develop so as to sanction an exception in cases involving jus cogens violations. Samantar 
seemed to indicate that under the common law, individual determinations of immunity by 
the Executive Branch will be binding on courts.188 According to the brief submitted by 
the Government as amicus curiae in Samantar, these determinations will be based on 
principles “informed by customary international law and practice,” which include the 
recognition that “both current and former officials of a foreign state usually enjoy 
immunity for acts undertaken in their official capacity.”189  
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¶69 As anticipated by several amici in Samantar, future litigants will surely invoke jus 
cogens to justify an exception to the immunity of foreign officials under the common 
law.190 The circumstances appear ideal: contrary to cases involving foreign states, the 
FSIA, which restricted the courts’ ability to endorse such arguments (see supra Section 
IV.C) is no longer a factor. However, a case on head-of-state immunity suggests that 
immunity determinations by the Executive might similarly constrain courts’ discretion. 
As mentioned above, in cases involving heads of states, courts have consistently deferred 
to individual determinations of immunity by the Executive, and this already before 
Samantar. In an ATS action where the State Department had asserted head-of-state 
immunity for the President of China, plaintiffs-appellants argued that “the Executive 
Branch has no power to immunize a head of state (or any person for that matter) for acts 
that violate jus cogens norms of international law.”191 The Seventh Circuit, however, 
rejected their claim, holding that determinations by the Executive Branch had to be 
accepted by the Judiciary “without reference to the underlying claims of a plaintiff.”192 
Even in the particular class of cases involving jus cogens, the court considered itself “no 
more free to ignore the Executive Branch’s determination than we are free to ignore a 
legislative determination concerning a foreign state [i.e., the FSIA].”193 This decision 
seems to indicate that it will fall to the Executive alone to carve out an exception to the 
immunity of foreign officials. As an amicus in Samantar, the Government recognized 
that the Executive’s discretion in determining whether a foreign official should be 
granted immunity is framed by customary international law.194 As highlighted above, 
customary international law does not currently entail an exception to the immunity of 
foreign officials in case of jus cogens violations, nor does jus cogens, per se, educe such 
an effect. In a manner comparable to a principle articulated in persuasive authority, jus 
cogens affords a reasoned basis to depart from the existing rules on foreign officials’ 
immunity. Future cases will reveal whether the U.S. Executive Branch will be receptive 
to this justification and follow the path previously opened by some courts in denying 
immunity to foreign officials accused of jus cogens or other serious human rights 
violations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶70 The controversies around the issue of foreign sovereign immunity in cases 
involving serious human rights violations are far from settled. Despite the ICJ’s assertion 
to the contrary in the Arrest Warrant case, experience has shown that immunity for 
international crimes all too often amounts to impunity, since victims generally have no 
access to the courts of the state in which the abuses took place, and their prospects to 
obtain redress at the international level remain limited due the lack of effective 
adjudication mechanisms.195 In cases where abuses amount to a breach of a peremptory 
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norm of international law, some have argued that the special status of these norms 
necessarily implies that foreign states or foreign officials be denied immunity in domestic 
courts. This article contends that jus cogens, per se, elicits no such effect. Instead, 
peremptory norms can have a bearing on foreign sovereign immunity to the extent that 
they indicate that the adjudication by foreign courts of cases involving abuses such as 
torture, slavery or genocide would be consistent with the values universally recognized as 
deserving of absolute protection. They stand for the proposition that such adjudications 
could constitute a reasonable limitation on the independence of states. 
¶71 Other considerations, however, may also weigh on the doctrine’s evolution. At a 
broader level, the issue of the scope of foreign sovereign immunity in the case of jus 
cogens and other international human rights violations relates to the search for a system 
of worldwide enforcement of human rights. “How can the world institute the global 
enforcement of fundamental human rights in a manner that is fair and accurate and that 
does not inflame international tensions?”196 Is the expansion of national adjudication of 
jus cogens and human rights violations by national courts the preferable course or should 
such determinations be left to the international justice system? The matter is 
controversial, as reflected by some of the Judges’ opinions in the Arrest Warrant case. 
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Burgenthal, in particular, wrote that they “reject the 
suggestion that the battle against impunity is ‘made over’ to international treaties and 
tribunals, with national courts having no competence in such matters.”197 In contrast, 
Judge Guillaume expressed his concern that the unrestrained exercise of jurisdiction over 
international crimes by the courts of every state in the world would “risk creating total 
judicial chaos” and “encourage the arbitrary for the benefit of the powerful, purportedly 
acting as agent for an ill-defined international community.”198 These questions are 
essential, since the real means for honoring the normative value of jus cogens norms will 
be achieved by building the enforcement system that will make them a tangible reality.  
¶72 With regard to the U.S., an amendment to the FSIA would be required to statutorily 
grant jurisdiction over cases involving jus cogens violations committed by states in 
contexts other than terrorism. Although a number of amendments have been introduced 
to allow human rights suits against foreign states under certain conditions, none has yet 
been adopted.199 Meanwhile, Samantar seems to have shifted responsibility for 
determining the scope of foreign officials’ immunity from the Judiciary to the Executive. 
As for now, it is unclear whether the Executive Branch will follow the lead of Circuit 
Courts that have allowed damages to be awarded to the victims of jus cogens violations 
and other human rights abuses at the hands of foreign officials.  
¶73 Because customary international rules on foreign sovereign immunity emerge 
primarily from the practice of individual states, the next round of U.S. cases in light of 
Samantar will be highly consequential in determining whether the nascent trend toward a 
new exception to foreign sovereign immunity persists or fades. In its brief submitted as 
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amicus curiae in Samantar, the Government stressed its condemnation of the grave 
human rights abuses alleged in the case, and its “strong foreign policy interest in 
promoting the protection of human rights.”200 At the same time, however, it also 
underscored the “significant implications” of foreign sovereign immunity “for the 
reciprocal treatment of United States officials and for our Nation’s foreign relations.”201 
If past actions are any indication, reciprocity concerns have weighed heavily on the 
Executive’s stance in other contexts where it has confronted this issue. For example, 
while its courts were awarding damages to victims of human rights violations committed 
by foreign officials under the ATS, the U.S. opposed the inclusion of a human rights 
exception in the JISP Convention, asserting that the tort exception of the Convention 
“must be read in the light of established State practice to concern tortious acts or 
omissions of a private nature which were attributable to the State, while preserving 
immunity for those acts of a strictly sovereign or governmental nature.”202 For the U.S., 
“extending that jurisdiction without regard to the accepted private/public 
distinction under international law would be contrary to the existing 
principles of international law and would generate more disagreements 
and conflicts in domestic courts which could be better resolved, as they 
currently were, through State-to-State mechanisms.”203 
The U.S. has not always been of this view, however. A generation ago, U.S. Supreme 
Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, who was serving as Chief Counsel at the Nuremberg 
Trials, sharply and famously rejected the application of foreign officials’ immunity to the 
proceedings of the first international criminal tribunal, stating: “We do not accept the 
paradox that legal responsibility should be the least where power is the greatest.”204 This 
proposition undergirds the rule now uniformly applied before international criminal 
courts that the official status of the perpetrator does not constitute a defense to the 
commission of international crimes. 
¶74 After Samantar, the breakthrough for the conflict between human rights litigation 
and foreign officials’ immunity remains a potentiality which will only be confirmed if 
future Executive practice capitalizes on the latitude provided to it by the Supreme Court. 
Moreover, a decision from the ICJ is still awaited to indicate whether such development 
would be in line with the requirements of international law. Whether Jackson’s stance 
will be reflected in this evolution, only future outcomes will tell. 
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